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THE OMBUDSMEN AND THE COURTS J.K. CRAWSHAW 
"For this is not the liberty which we can hope, that 
no grievance ever should arise in the Commonwealth 
- that let no man in the world expect; but, when 
complaints are freely heard, deeply considered, and 
speedily reformed, then is the utmost bound of civil 
liberty attained that wise men look for." 
John Milton evokes thoughts of judicial wisdom and sublime conflict 
resolution in the title of the discoursel from which these words are 
taken, as well as in the words themselves. He was writing in defence 
of the freedom of the press in response to an order of Parliament 
requiring the approval and licensing of books before they could be 
published. Over three hundred years later, Sir Guy Powles, when the 
Ombudsman of New Zealand, used the same words 2 to summarise what he 
saw to be the function to which the holder of the office of Ombudsman 
should aspire. It is not an exaggeration to assert that the New 
Zealand Ombudsman, and indeed, Ombudsmen around the world have aspired 
to perform, within the limits of their jurisdictions, such a service. 
It is clear that Milton's words are applicable in a wider context. 
Indeed, it could be applied to all institutions and media involved in 
the resolution of conflict. 
In this paper, the Ombudsmen and the Courts, perhaps the most significant 
and certainly the most obvious of the other conflict resolving institut-
ions, will be examined and compared. It is my purpose to examine the 
similarities and differences that can be discerned in the two institutions. 
That obviously presents a vast panorama of investigation and I do not 
intend to even attempt to cover all of that field. I have decided to 
1 Areopagitica (1644l 
2 W. Clifford Clarke Memorial Lecture - "Aspects of the Search for 
Admini s trative Justice : With particular Reference to the New Zealand 
Ombudsman" (1966) I Canadian Public Administration 133 at 157 
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limit the examination in a number of ways. The first is almost a 
matter of necessity. The Ombudsmen's jurisdiction in New Zealand 
is limited bys 13 (1) of the Ombudsmen Act 19753 to the Government 
departments and organisations specified in the 1st Schedule to the 
Act4 • The Ombudsman is never directly concerned with disputes between 
private individuals and bodies. His jurisdiction is exclusively over 
governmental activity (whether it be central or local). However, 
within the governmental field most departments and organisations are 
subject to his investigation. In addition though, it must be noted 
that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over many tribunals 
which are intimately linked with the activity of Government in this 
country5 • 
On the other hand the courts have jurisdiction to administer the law 
and to regulate the whole field of human endeavour. Consequently, 
not only is it impracticable to compare the Ombudsmen with the courts 
in all their fields of jurisdiction, but also unnecessary. It may well 
be that it is appropriate to consider some aspects of the activity of 
the courts in the area of private law but in this paper I will be 
concerned almost solely with public law - the relationship of the 
individual to public authorities; and even more specifically with that 
part of public law where the courts have concerned themselves with the 
supervision of the activity of government. Secondly, in examining the 
differences and similarities of the institutions the paper will focus 
primarily on the third step in the process of conflict resolution out-
lined by John Milton. The word that a lawyer uses to describe the area 
the paper will be concerned with is 11 remedies 11 • That describes a part 
of what will be considered but my subject matter is wider than a 
comparison of a legal remedy like the injunction with a similar, or 
dissimilar, 11 remedy 11 of the Ombudsmen. The area of inquiry is perhaps 
better described by saying that the paper will examine the "resolution" 
3 Unless otherwise stated all references to s e ctions of the New 
Zealand Act will be to the Ombudsmen Act ]975. 
4 The Ombudsmen's jurisdiction is limited in a number of other 
ways ass 13 (1) itself shows. See also ss 13 (2), 13 (7), 13 (8), 
14. 
5 e.g. Town and Country Planning Appeal Boards, Local Government 
Commission, Commerce Commission, Transport Licensing Authorities 
and Transport Licensing Appeal Authorities, Social Security Appeal 
Authority. 
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of a complaint to, or case before, the Ombudsmen or the courts. In 
some situation it may be said that even "resolution" is too restrictive 
a word. What will really be being considered can only be described as 
a "response" of the Ombudsmen or the courts of a person coming to them. 
The reasons for this particular limitation are firstly; to limit the 
scope of the inquiry to a manageable size for a paper of this sort. 
Secondly, as will be explained, part of the purpose of this paper is to 
consider the constitutional ramifications of these two institutions 
working side by side in a similar area. The results that such achieve 
as a part of their response/resolution processes are the most likely to 
show whether their activity is of constitutional significance. The 
third limitation I have put on the scope of the inquiry is that to a 
large extent the paper will be concerned with the situation as it 
pertains in New Zealand. That is not to say that illustrations and 
developments will not be taken from the institutions in other countries 
where that is appropriate. 
Having made a detailed analysis of the response/resolution processes of 
the two institutions it is then my object to evaluate what effect, if 
any, they have had upon each other. I will then consider and evaluate 
their respective contributions to government and then try to discern 
whether there is any constitutional significance in their contributions. 
Before proceeding it is necessary to note five points. First, it is 
useful to state the obvious. Although this paper will be primarily 
concerned with two particular institutions, they cannot be divorced from 
the societal context in which they operate. Just as they have a part in 
shaping that society, so that society moulds them to meets its needs. 
This fact will be of particular significance when towards the end of the 
paper the impact of each of the institutions is considered in relation 
to the constitution. A closely related factor relevant to that consider-
ation is that the Ombudsmen and the courts operate alongside other 
conflict resolving agencies. It would appear obvious that the activity 
and development of the latter is going to affect to some measure the 
activity and development of the former. Secondly, this paper almost 
exactly marks the fifteenth anniversary of the inception of the office 
of Ombudsman in New Zealand6 . On one hand it may be said that 15 years 
6 On the 1st October 1962 
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is by far too short a time to provide a reasonable basis upon which 
the institution can be validly compared with that of the courts whose 
history and development stretches over centuries. That contention 
cannot be dismissed in any off-hand manner but on the other hand it may 
be said that the Ombudsman institution in this country has moved beyond 
being a fledgling, that it has established itself as a significant part 
of the constitutional structure and that the 14,184 complaints it has 
received 7 in those fifteen years provide more than a sufficient basis 
upon which to begin a comparison. Furthermore, the fact that one of 
the institutions, the courts, has, as it were, always been a part of our 
constitutional scene and has had a part in moulding its development, but 
has now been joined by another institution which operates in a similar 
sphere presents within itself a challenge to examine and evaluate the 
constitutional import of such an addition. Thirdly, it is clear that 
a factor which must have an important bearing on the whole inquiry is 
that the institution of the Ombudsman is dependent for its existence 
upon a statute whereas the courts originate from the king as the fount 
of justice and have, especially in the area of their supervision of the 
executive arm of government, an inherent jurisdiction which is supple-
mented by statute. To be more accurate, that is true of the Supreme 
Court, which, as far as the courts are concerned is the central actor 
in the supervision of governmental activity and which has inherited its 
jurisdiction from the Court of Queen's Bench, In addition the courts 
have had centuries to develop their approach to their supervisory role 
and, by virtue of the doctrine of precedent, to have developed it along 
particular lines. 
Fourthly, the institution of the Ombudsman has operated during a period 
of judicial activism in relation to the supervisory role, and the com-
parison of the institutions must be in the light of that. 
Fifthly, in New Zealand the Ombudsman institution has just undergone 
significant development in that the Ombudsmen Act 1975, which as to 
the relevant parts came into effect on 1 April 1976, brought local 
government authorities within the ambit of the Ombudsmen's jurisdiction. 
Although it does not extend the basis upon which an Ombudsman can begin 
7 Up to 31st March 1977. 1977 Report p.4. 
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an investigation8 is nevertheless an important step in the development 
of the institution and while its effect is still somewhat unfathomable, 
it can be seen in some measure to support part of Professor Hills' 
thesi~that the process of the institutionalisation of the Ombudsman 
involved the office, and the efficacy and usefulness of its operation, 
being accepted on a widespread basis both within government and without. 
It should also be noted that the 1975 Act provides for the appointment 
of "one or more Ombudsmen" .10 That provision is not without importance 
to the development of the institution. 
Each of these five factors must be kept in mind in the course of the 
examination of the response/resolution processes of institutions and 
will be particularly relevant when the constitutional ramifications 
are considered and when possible developments for the future are 
canvassed. 
The Approach 
As I suggested before there is a challenge, to analyse and evaluate the 
importance for the constitution of the fact that these two institutions 
are working side by side in a similar field, inherent in the fact that 
8 That can be qualified by saying that the 1975 Act repealed these 
parts of the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962 that 
were added to that Act by the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) 
Amendment Act 1968 relating to professional activities of employees 
of Hospital Boards and Education Boards which were brought within 
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by that amendment. They appeared 
in the 1962 Act ass 11 (lA) & s 11 (5) (d) & (e) and prevented the 
Ombudsman from investigating any decision, recommendation, act or 
ommission relating to the professional activities of these employees. 
Under the 1975 the Ombudsman's basis of jurisdiction is "relating to 
a matter of administration", s 13 (1), which would appear to allow 
the Ombudsman to investigate the actions of teachers if they are 
"relating to a matter of administration" and consequently there may 
be said to be some extension of jurisdiction in this way. 
9 Larry B Hill, "The Model Ombudsman", P,rincetown University Press, 
1976. 
10 s 3 (1) 
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one of the institutions is a newcomer with particular characteristics 
of its own. It is primarily for this reason - the Ombudsmen being 
recent intruders upon the scene - that in analysing the work of the 
institutions more emphasis will be placed on the output of the 
Ombudsman in the last fifteen years. Although the work of the courts 
in this area is not easily delineated and compactly described 
(especially in the wake of recent and continuing judicial activity) 
its general outlines and myriad details have nevertheless been the 
subject of considerable study and documentation1 ~ On the other hand, 
the Ombudsman institution has been subject to a number of descriptive 
studies12, but its 11 common law 11 has received little elucidation1 ~ Its 
11 common law 11 holds the most importance for the purposes of the present 
study. 
The way I intend to proceed with the comparison of the institutions is 
first to outline some of their basic structural, procedural and 
essential si~ilarities and differences. Then the particular responses 
that each of the institutions can make to an individual coming to them 
will be outlined. It will then be appropriate to examine in detail the 
substance of the response/resolution processes of each institution. 
This will be done by having regard to each of the spheres where the 
institutions have a direct impact, by virtue of their response, in 
turn. First, they will be considered as to their impact for the 
individuals who come to them. Secondly, their impact upon the public 
authorities over which they have a supervisory jurisdiction will be 
examined. At that point it should be possible to summarise the salient 
features of the response/resolution processes of the two institutions 
and to note a number of miscellaneous but relevant factors before 
evaluating what the similarities and differences mean and whether they 
point to any future developments. 
11 e.g. SA de Smith, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" (3rd 
edition) 1973; JAG Griffith and H Street, "Principles of Adminis-
trative Law" (4th edition) - to name only two major texts. 
12 W Gellhorn, "Ombudsmen and Others", 1967; DC Rowat, "The Ombudsman 
- Citizens Defender" (2nd edition) 1968. 
13 But see e.g . G Sawer, "The Jurisprudence of Ombudsmen" 1971; 
30 Public Administration, p221 and K J Keith, "The Ombudsman and 
'Wrong' Decisions 11 197), 4 N.Z.U.L.R., p361. 
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The Basic Characteristics 
If a person is asked to describe the similarities and differences 
between the Ombudsmen and the Courts, the chances are that he will 
immediately set about pointing out that the Ombudsman is a nice chap 
who works in nice offices and is always ready to listen to you but 
who doesn't really have much bite to his bark whereas the courts are 
rather distant, terribly formal places which only those who work in 
them understand but which, if you can get them to see your point of 
view will order that justice be done and which have the power to see 
that it is done. The point is that the immediate tendency is to 
focus upon obvious differences that exist between the institutions. 
However, a case can be made out that from a constitutional point of 
view it is the characteristics that are common to both institutions 
that are important (or at least as significant as the differences) in 
determining the impact of the institutions. 
(a) Essential Similarities 
The first is a composite of a number of activities that are common to 
both but which can be subsumed under the statement that both bodies 
are in the business of conflict resolution, of the doing of justice. 
It is true that the courts have a function of interpreting, declaring 
and upholding the law but that function in the perspective of the whole 
work of the courts is ancillary to their primary aim of resolving 
conflicts, whether they be between the state and the individual in 
criminal matters, the individual and the state in public law matters, 
or individual and individual in private law matters, and of seeing that 
justice is done. The Ombudsmen also have ancillary functions, some of 
which will be considered presently, but their primary function is to 
continue the search for and achieve administrative justice~ 4 The 
components to this common trait which are also common to both institutions 
are the fact that they are complaint based, information eliciting and 
14 See e.g. 1965 Report of the Ombudsman, New Zealand, pS; and the 
title and substance of Sir Guy Powles lecture to the Canadian 
Institute of Pub~ic Administration - "Aspects of the Search for 
Administrative Justice", opcit n.2. 
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issue determining bodies. 
The other major similarity of the two institutions is that they have 
jurisdiction in the same area - the supervision of the activity of 
governmental bodies. As will be seen, that supervision is carried out 
in different ways and is to some extent over different things but it 
is in a common area. 
The combination of these factors - similar ambitions for the same 
territory - may be significant in the constitutional context because 
it admits of the possibility first, of an ascendancy conflict and 
secondly, (one of the institutions having claimed the territory for 
itself, or for its ultimate control), of resultantconstitutional 
reverberations and development. The point may be better understood in 
an analogy. Consider the case of two men who are set a task by their 
employer of cultivating crops. One of the men has had several years 
previous experience at the job, but the other is better equipped both 
in a talent for cultivation, physical build and the implements he has 
at his disposal to carry out the task at hand. It soon becomes apparent 
to the employer that the second man is far more efficient and productive 
at the cultivating task. It is also apparent to the other man. This 
could lead to conflict between the two but more than likely would lead 
to the employer placing the effective labourer in a position of respon-
sibility over the first man, or perhaps even doing without the services 
of the first man altogether, in the hope that he could further increase 
his production and efficiency and perhaps move into processing and 
marketing his own goods. To be sure, the analogy is replete with 
assumptions about the ways of the world and carefully avoids alluding 
to the possible effect of the problems and the realities of life but my 
point is that the possibility of one being preferred to the other does 
present itself. As much can be seen from the rise and fall of the Court 
of Star Chamber during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
It is admitted that the times are not as turbulent as they were then and 
the constitution is more stable now than it was then. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional scene in New Zealand is by no means static and the fact 
that both the Courts and the Ombudsmen are actors in that scene means 
they have the chance to make their mark upon it. 
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(b) Basic Differences 
As has been stated, the common characteristics of the two bodies and 
the affect of them is important to a constitutional evaluation of them. 
The differences must also be closely noted especially as the possession 
of certain characteristics to the exclusion of the other may show which 
body is better equipped to perform the tasks which are set before it. 
It has already been noted that the Ombudsman institution is statute 
based whereas the courts have an inherent jurisdiction which has been 
built up during centuries. This would seem to suggest that the 
Ombudsmen are somewhat more limited in extending and developing their 
jurisdiction than are the courts. On present realities that is largely 
true, but it is not necessarily so. First, the ability to develop 
jurisdiction is, for both the courts and the Ombudsmen, dependent some-
what on external factors; the most important being whether Parliament 
or perhaps more correctly, the Executive is content to let them continue 
in their activities. If it is not then it can prune their growth with 
legislation. Secondly, it has been noted by Professor Keith that, "the 
concept of jurisdiction has a more rubbery character in the case of the 
Ombudsman than in the case of the courts. 1115 Examples which illustrate this 
will be noted when the substance of the responses are examined but the 
fact is that the Ombudsmen are examining things under the rubric of 
"relating to a matter of administration 11 that are beyond the contem-
plation even of those who were closely associated with the inception of 
the institution in New Zealand.16 The fact that there is a statutory 
basis for the office and . jurisdiction of the Ombudsman isn't prohibitive 
of~ development but nevertheless it would appear to allow a more 
limited development than that attainable by the courts. 
Another essential difference is that from the inception of the office of 
Ombudsman in New Zealand the Ombudsmen were conceived of as having close 
links with Parliament. Indeed, the very name of the instituting Act 
- the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962 - clearly demon-
strates this intended link. A short perusal of the 1962 Act indicates 
that the link was expressly and deliberately formulated. The Parliarrentary 
Commissioner was to be "an officer of Parliament 111~Ahe was to be appointed 
15 K J Keith, "The Ombudsman's Jurisdiction: What is a 'Matter of 
Administration1" "Proceedings of the Conference of Australasian 
and Pacific Ombudsmen 1974" p.14. 
16 e.g. The Honourable Ralph Hanan, 1961 NZPD 1807. 
16A 1962 Acts 2(1) cf. 1975 Acts 3(1). 
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''on the recommendation of the House of Representatives "1 ~ he was to 
resign his office "by writing addressed to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives"1~ he could only be removed from office "upon an 
address from the House of Representatives"1~ the House of Represent-
atives could make rules for the guidance of the Commissioner2 ~ his 
ultimate sanction in a particular case was a "report to Parliament"21 
and he was required "in each year to make a report to Parliament 
22 on the exercise of his functions under (the) Act" . Although all of 
the sections establishing this link in the 1962 Act have been almost 
exactly repeated in the 1975 Act, and therefore, it may be said, the 
link with Parliament is as basic as it ever was to the institution, 
it can also be argued that the 1975 Act represents a change in the 
status of Ombudsmen as a parliamentary officer. In extending the 
Ombudsmen's jurisdiction to local authorities it was obviously 
inappropriate that the Ombudsman, as the ultimate sanction in a 
complaint against a local authority, should report to Parliament. 
Consequently, the solution of having the Ombudsmen reporting the 
results of their investigations to the full committee of the local 
authority will the additional right to require the publication of 
their findings 23 can be seen to be somewhat in derogation of the idea 
that the Ombudsman was Parliament's man, a tool to enable the hetter 
control of the excesses of executive government. However, it is a 
fact that in New Zealand the status of the Ombudsmen as officers of 
the legislature has never been as important to the operation of the 
institution as it has in Britain, for instance, where the Parliamentary 
Commissioner is directly linked to a parliamentary select committee 
and where he can only investigate complaints that are passed on to him 
by mem1bers of Parliament24 • Nevertheless, the link however important 
it may or may not be~ provided for in the New Zealand statute and 
this fact is obviously in marked contrast to the courts. Over the 
17 1962 Acts 2 (2) cf. 1975 Acts 3 ( 2) . 
18 1962 Act s 4 ( 3) cf. 1975 Acts 5 ( 3) • 
19 1962 Acts 5 (1) cf. 1975 Acts 6 (1) . 
20 1962 Acts 12 (1) cf. 1975 Acts 15 ( 1) . 
21 1962 Acts 19 (4) cf. 1975 Acts 22 (4) . 
22 1962 Acts 25 cf. 1975 Act s 29. See also 1962 Act SS 6, 8 (2) ' 
11 (3) as to further manifestations of the link. 
23 s 22 (6) & s 23. 
24 SS 4 & 5; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. 
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centuries the courts have increasingly loosed themselves from their 
shackles to the king and have forged for themselves a position of 
integral importance in the British style of constitution, such that 
a strong and effective judicial arm of government is considered 
essential to the system of checks and balances which in turn are seen 
as essential to the working of the constitution. The catchword to be 
applied to the courts and to the judiciary who sit in them is 
"independence 11 • They are in no sense delegates or extensions of 
Parliament. Manifestations of the recognition of this independence 
may be seen in the Judicature Act 1908. Judges of the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal are to be appointed by the Governor General 
(with no requirement that it be upon the recommendation of the House of 
Representatives) 25 , are to hold office during good behaviour26 until 
they reach the age of 72 27 It is true that they may be removed from 
office on the address of the House of Representatives for certain mis-
conduct28. However, their tenure of office is secure and to a large 
extent beyond political manipulation. All this is elementary. However, 
it needs to be noted because the origins and constitutions of these 
two institutions are obviously going to have an effect on their impact 
and future development. To this end it is also necessary to notice that 
the Ombudsman is not so much Parliament 1 s man as to be subject to every 
whim and storm of Parliamentary life. His independence is safeguarded 
in a number of ways in the statute and is asserted in practice. First, 
and obviously, his area of jurisdiction is set down by statute29 . 
Secondly, his salary is a charge on the Consolidated Reserve Account30 
and so he can't be subject to parliamentary pressure in that area. 
Thirdly, his term of office is for five years 31 which although it provides 
more room for political influences than in the case of the judiciary, is 
nevertheless effective to bridge over a change of power at elections. 
Fourthly, the Ombudsmen are empowered to regulate their own procedure, 
although that power is subject to the Act and any rules made for the 
guidance of the Ombudsmen by the House32 . It is obvious that although 
some measure of independence is reserved to the Ombudsmen they are 
nevertheless not in the position of independence enjoyed by the judiciary. 
25 s 4. 
26 s 7. 
27 s 13. 
28 s 8. 
29 Seen. 4 supra 
30 s 9. 
31 s 5. 
32 s 18 (7). 
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Another difference between the two institutions is that of size. The 
institution of Ombudsman started in 1962 with one Ombudsman in 
Wellington and as the work load has increased and the jurisdiction 
has been increased over the years, so has the staff increased until 
now there is a total of three Ombudsmen with a supporting staff of 
twenty-eight spread between three offices in Wellington, Auckland and 
Christchurch 33. The courts are in clear contrast with the Supreme 
Court alone having a total of sixteen registries linked to courthouses 
and twenty judges on the Bench, to say nothing of the hundreds of 
supporting staff. In the past this has meant that the Ombudsman's 
office has become renowned for its friendly personalised nature which 
no matter how hard an attempt is made to achieve such a personal touch 
in the courts where it is perceived as desirable, such as in the 
Magistrates Court in its domestic jurisdiction, it is never really 
attained. More will be noted of the affect of this factor when the 
impact of the institution responses on the individual is examined. 
A major difference between the Ombudsmen and the Courts is their method 
of information eliciting (which has been noted as a common trait). The 
methods may be described as investigatory, in the case of the Ombudsmen, 
and adversary, in the case of the Courts. At this point, to note the 
special powers conferred upon the Ombudsmen to enable them to carry out 
their investigations 34 ; that each technique has its own advantages and 
disadvantages, which means that each is better suited to different tasks; 
and that the two institutions are differently equipped in this respect is 
sufficient. 
A difference which is linked to the last two is that of formality. Only 
a limited knowledge of the institutions is needed for it to be clear that 
the requirements made of a complainant in bringing his complaint to each, 
the procedure employed in considering a complaint, and environmental 
factors like the physical layout of a courtroom, the way a judge is 
dressed and the requirements as to address of a judge are very much more 
formal in the case of the courts than in that of the Ombudsmen. Again, 
the relevance of this difference will be discussed as the paper proceeds. 
The final difference that I wish to note at this stage is probably one of 
the better known distinctions between the Ombudsmen and the Courts. It 
is the fact that the Ombudsmen have no direct coercive power - they cannot 
demand that their decision on a particular matter be put into effect and 
33 1977 Report of the Ombudsman p.9. 34 s 18 (2), (3) & (7) 
& s 19 (1), (2), (3) & (4) 
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then enforce it if it is not. They can on 1 y recommend .35 On the other 
hand the courts not only have the authority to make a determination of 
a matter; they also have the machinery to see that that determination 
is complied with. However, the situation is not as simple as it may 
appear on the face of it, as will be analysed in more detail later. 
Suffice it to say that even though the Ombudsman only has been given 
a power of recommendation his success rate in having recommendations 
complied with is admirable. This may be indicative of two things or 
a combination of both of them. It may show that the Ombudsman and the 
administration which he investigates share in common the same or very 
similar normative values. It may also be that the sanctions able to be 
wielded by the Ombudsmen by virtue of their status, and those of the 
power to report to Parliament and use publicity are more efficacious 
than they would first appear. The other side of the coin is that the 
courts are not in a position to enforce orders made against the Crown 
but as de Smith says, 11 This is not a matter of any consequence, for 
the Crown does comply with judgements against it. 11 36 
The picture, as so far described, shows that the Ombudsmen and the 
Courts have two essential traits in common and that while there are a 
number of structural and procedural differences discernible, they may 
not be as different as they at first seem. 
What are the responses that can be made to a complaint? 
In this section of the paper I wish merely to set out the different 
responses that are made by the Ombudsmen and the Courts. 
The Ombudsmen, when they receive a complaint may: 
decline it for lack of jurisdiction 
on the grounds that it does not relate to a body within their 
jurisdiction (s 13 (1) & 1st Sch) 
on the grounds that it is not 11 relating to a matter of administration 
(s 13 (1)) 
on the grounds that one of the other jurisdictional restrictions 
exclude it (s 13 (7) (b) (c) (d), s 13 (8), s 14) 
35 s 22 (3) & (4) 36 SA de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, 1971, p.596. 
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decline it consequent on an exercise of their discretion under the 
proviso to s 13 (7) (a) (relating to the existence of right of 
appeal and it being unreasonable to expect the complainant to resort 
or to have resorted to it), and s 17 (1) (a) and s 17 (2) (relating 
to adequate remedies being available and to too great a delay in 
bringing the complaint or whether the complaint is frivolous, 
vexatious, not in good faith or trivial, or there is no sufficient 
personal interest in the complainant). 
give advice to the complainant or refer him to an appropriate person 
or body capable of assisting him even if the complaint has been 
declined on either of the above bases. 
begin an investigation of the complaint but have it withdrawn by the 
complainant in the course of the investigation (for any number of 
reasons personal to the complainant). 
begin an investigation of the complaint but discontinue it under 
s 17 (1) (b) for reasons including: 
a finding that there was in fact a jurisdictional limitation on 
the investigation. 
the complaint being rectified by the department or body being 
investigated to the complainant's satisfaction before the invest-
igation is completed. 
investigate the complaint, find it not justified and make no 
suggestions or recommendations (s 22(3)). 
investigate the complaint, find it not justified but make a 
suggestion or recommendation to the department or body against 
whom the complaint was made (s 22 (3)). 
investigate the complaint and find it justified (s 22(3)). 
(Rectification made by the department or body against whom the 
finding was made or rectification no longer possible because 
e.g. the situation giving rise to the complaint had passed). 
investigate the complaint, find it justified and make a recommen-
dation (s 22(3)). 
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There are two further things to note about a response which involves 
a recommendation. If a recommendation is not accepted by the depart-
ment or body to which it is made then the Ombudsmen have, in the 
case of organisations included in Parts I & II of the Ist Schedule to 
the Act, a power under s 22 (4) to send his report and recommendation 
to the Prime Minister and can then report to Parliament. In the case 
of Part III organisations they can have their recommendation published. 
The other point is that the recommendations made need not be specif-
ically related to the complaint which spawned it. It can involve a 
reference to any of the matters ins 22 (3) (b) to (g); which include 
the examination of any law or practice on which the decision, recommend-
ation, act or ommission, which gave rise to the complaint, was based. 
The Courts, when an action is brought before them may: 
decline it for lack of jurisdiction 
e.g. the Magistrates Courts have specific limits on their juris-
diction under the Magistrates Court Act 1948. 
the Supreme Court is not particularly hindered in this respect, 
especially in the area of its supervisory role except that it may 
feel compelled to decline for a lack of jurisdiction where an 
original jurisdiction has been conferred by statute upon a special 
tribunal. 
Nevertheless it will retain its supervisory role over that tribunal 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. 
decline it for a procedural defect 
e.g. where the plaintiff/applicant has no locus standi, or where 
a time limit operates as a bar. (However, this possibility is 
often modified by virtue of a discretion residing in the court. 
e.g. to extend time limits where very good reasons are shown 
- (R594 of the Code of Civil Procedure)). 
~7 
decline it on the basis that no cause of action is disclosed, hear 
and determine the action according to law and: 
- dismiss it as not being sustainable in fact 
- dismiss it as not being sustainable in law 
37 For a recent example see Takaro Properties Ltd (in receivership) 
and Another v Rowling [1976) 2NZLR 657. 
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dismiss it in the exercise of discretion that e.g. an order of 
the court couldn't be supervised, or that alternative remedies 
were available, or that the applicants delay and conduct precluded 
relief. 37A 
- grant the relief claimed or some other appropriate relief as 
provided for in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 whether it be 
an order38 quashing the decision made, or prohibiting an attempt to 
act in excess of jurisdiction, or compelling the matter to be 
determined according to law or enjoining some activity or declaring 
the law and/or the rights and duties of the parties or referring 
the matter back to the appropriate body for reconsideration with 
d · . 39 1rect1ons. 
The above is only an outline of the possible responses which the courts 
can use in respect of complaints that come before them. To fill in the 
minutiae would require a book or two on Court practice and procedure~0 
It has already been noted that the Courts employ an adversarial 
procedure in order to elicit the facts and the law relevant to the 
matter before them. This is significant in this context of possible 
responses because it means, in principle, that the courts response in 
any particular case is limited to (or at least strongly influenced by) 
the case that is presented to it by the parties before it. In practice 
of course the courts do direct the parties to relevant matters that they 
are aware of. However, that is not always the case. For instance, 
if objection to the locus standi of a party is not made by another party 
then the courts' deliberations may take place without the matter being 
considered~
0
'Turthermore, the courts are not in a position of being able 
to attempt to ascertain the salient facts for themselves, nor are they 
expected to research their own law. In the judicial system those tasks 
are ostensibly for the parties and their counsel appearing in the case. 
By comparison the Ombudsmen, although they depend to some extent upon 
the area of in~uiry being indicated by the complainant, are, in principle 
and in practice, nowhere near as limited as the courts to the case 
presented to them by the "parties". They have the means to investigate 
37A See de Smith, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", Part Three 
38 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 s 4 (1) generally, PP 372-77, 389-95, 
. 456-61 500-04. 
39 Judicature Amendment Act 1972 s 4 (5) ' 
40 In addition, an intimate association with each of them is not necessary 
for the purposes of this paper, in the same way as the details of the 
Ombudsmen's procedure are not essential. 
40a See e.g. Prescott v Birmingham Corporation [1955) Ch.210 
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the complaint irrespective of the activity of the "parties", and they 
make use of those means. 
A perusal of the different ways that a court can respond to an action 
before it would seem to indicate that it has open to it a narrower 
range of responses than that open to the Ombudsmen. Remembering what 
has been said about the inability of the court to enforce orders 
against the Crown it can be noted that at one end of the spectrum the 
Ombudsmen have a practice of giving advice to complainants or of 
referring them to the person equipped to deal with their problem:
1 
There is no similar practice or procedure employed by the courts. At 
the other end of the spectrum the Ombudsmen have the express power to 
make recommendations in respect of: 
"A rule of law or a provision of any Act, regulation, 
or bylaw or a practice that is or may br unreasonable, 
. . . 1 d. . . 1142 unJust, oppressive, or improper y iscriminatory. 
The job of the courts is to uphold the law. For that reason cases can 






invalid because they are contrary to the law. 
But the courts are not in a position to declare a rule of law or 
any statutory provision invalid or illegal .
46 
Their job is to uphold 
the law, not to question it or amend it and the doctrine of precedent 
is one of the safeguards to ensure that that is done. The Ombudsmen 
41 See e.g. 1967 Report p.3, 1977 Report pp. 11 & 12. 
42 s 22 (1) (b) 
43 e.g. FE Jackson and Company Limited v Collector of Customs [1939) 
NZLR 682 where a regulation made prohibiting "allgoods" was not 
regulatory in terms of the statute. 
44 e.g. Staples & Co (Limited) v The Mayor, Councillors, and Citizens 
of the City of Wellington (1900) 18 NZLR 857 
45 e.g. Anderson v Valuer General [1974) NZLR 603 where methods of 
valuation employed were not in accordance with the statute 
46 The position is somewhat different in a jurisdiction like Canada 
where the British North America Act 1867 is to be complied with. 
See also Thorson v Attorney-General of Canada etal (No 2) (1974) 
43 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at p.11 per Laskin J. It is similarly so in 
countries having written constitutions. The constitutionality of 
legislation is a justiciable issue. 
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are not so restricted and have generally47 interpreted their power 
liberally (even to the extent that Sir Guy Powles felt able to comment 
on a Bill - the Immigration Amendment Bill 1968 - and to discuss it 
with the Minister and departmental officials while it was in the course 
of its passage through the House4~, and to exercise it in appropriate 
circumstances. In 1969 the Ombudsman noted that: 
"(the power) entails, provided the other requirements 
of my jurisdiction are met, an examination, in appro-
priate cases, of departmental studies and recommendations 
leading to the submission of the draft legislation to 
the House and also an examination of the substance of 
the legislation itself as passed. This has been found 
in practice to be a useful aspect of the jurisdiction. 1149 
He also commented that the power was most frequently exercised in 
relation to subordinate legislation. Nevertheless the power does 
extend to principal legislation and is exercised in respect of it. 
The courts are restricted to dealing with the matters before them 
(which in turn is dependent upon what use the parties present). They 
47 But see case no. Wll570 against the Accident Compensation Commission 
reported at (1977) INZAR p.113 - G Laking, Ombudsman. The fact that 
an investigation had not been completed within the terms of s 22(1) 
- the complaint not having any basis in the light of the existing law 
- was said to preclude the making of a recommendation under s 22(3) (e) 
even in the light of the fact that there was a potent injustice 
p e rpetrated by the law. The Ombudsman did also note that there was 
a right of appeal coming within s 13(7) (a) but felt disinclined to 
exercise his discretion in accordance with the proviso. This seems 
to be in contrast to the approach of the Ombudsman in the past, who, 
where there was a law as obviously discriminatory as the one in this 
case, had no hesitation in recommending a change - as a sort of own 
motion procedure. In this case the Ombudsman doesn't appear to 
consider the possibility of proceeding on his own motion under s 13(3). 
As to the availability of appeal point, it would seem that this would 
have been an entirely appropriate occasion when the Ombudsman could 
exercise his discretion in favour of the complainant. The state of 
the law rendered pointless the exercising of appeal rights. Further-
more, if this approach is right, how can an unjust statutory provision 
ever be the subject of a recommendation for no complaints including 
them could ever be fully investigated. 
48 1969 Report p.8 
49 ibid 
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are primarily concerned to do justice in the particular case and if 
injustice has been due to an invalid bylaw then they will declare it 
to be so. But that declaration of invalidity is ancillary to the 
primary task. The courts do not concern themselves with possibilities 
of future injustice whereas the Ombudsman is to attempt to secure 
justice in particular cases as well to secure administrative justice 
generally for the benefit of future generations. That much must be 
seen to be the import of his power to make recommendations about 
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory practices 
and laws. Before leaving this point it is necessary to note that 
irrespective of there not being an express power in the courts to make 
recommendations regarding legislation they nevertheless have a consid-
erable affect on legislation. It is obvious for example, that great 
areas of statute law are merely codification of the case law developed 
by the courts~ 0 Other enactments are in response to decisions of the 
courts which show up manifest injustice. In addition there are examples 
of cases where direct comment has been made on a statutory provision by 
a member of the bench in the course of a case and which comment has been 
taken notice of by the legislature and has resulted in (or at least 
contributed to) appropriate statutory amendment~1 
The Substance of the Response/Resolution Process 
Before embarking upon an analysis of the activity of the two institut-
ions in this aspect, I wish to note a technical detail. In this section 
of the paper the impact of the response/resolution preferred by either 
the Ombudsmen or the courts in different contexts will be considered 
first in relation to the individuals who bring complaints and secondly, 
in relation to the department or body against whom the complaint is made. 
In the process of doing this however there will be some overlap in the 
factors considered. For instance, when a complaint is rectified for one 
50 e.g. Sale of Goods Act 1908 based upon the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
which was an attempt at codification of the common law, Crimes 
Act 1961. 
51 A recent example is' the criticisms of s 108 of the Land and Income 
Tax Act 1954 by Lord Wilberforce in Mangin v Inland Revenue Com-
missioner (N.Z.) (1970) IATR 835 at 845 and the harsh words of 
McCarthy Pin Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Gerard [1974]. 2 NZLR 
279 at pp, 280-281 - the result being what is now s 99 of the Income 
Tax Act 1976. 
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reason of another that is important for the individual complainant 
but it also involves some cost on the part of the department which 
is of some significance to it. The substance of the process almost 
always affects both the complainant and the organisation complained 
against, and more often than not the impact is significant for both 
parties. This fact should not be lost sight of while each is considered 
separately. 
(A) Response Touching Individuals 
Some of these have already been mentioned when the responses that each 
institution was able to make were considered. 
(i) Advice and referral service52 
This is a trait which appears to be universal to Ombudsmen and in some 
offices is being seen as an increasingly important task even though 
nowhere is there statutory authority for it. It is a practice which 
has grown from two sources. The first is that from the beginning of 
the offices it was apparent that many complaints were coming to the 
Ombudsmen that were outside of their jurisdiction but which they, in 
the light of the aims of the institution, were reluctant to turn away 
without any solace or help at all. The second is simply that such a 
service was a need of the population and they determined to attempt to 
meet that need within the resources available to them. This activity 
of the Ombudsmen in some offices is coming to be considered so signi-
ficant to their task that they are keeping relatively detailed stat-
istics in respect of them53 and for instance in the office of the Ontario 
Ombudsman an index of services and individuals along with addresses, 
telephone numbers and relevant information is being developed in order 
to be able to quickly provide complainants and enquiries with helpful 
information in respect of their problem or question~4 Clearly, the 
courts do not involve themselves in a task such as this at all (except 
perhaps to the extent that it may be said that solicitors are daily 
called upon to give advice as to wide ranging matters, and that they 
52 N.41 supra. See alsol970 Report of the Alberta Ombudsman, p.9; 
1976 Report of the Alberta Ombudsman, p.7; 1970 Report of the 
Manitoba Ombudsman, p.10. 
53 e.g. 1st Annual Report of the Ontario Ombudsman 1975-76; H.S. Doi, 
Ombudsman, Hawaii, "The Work, Staffing and Administration of an 
Ombudsman's Office", Proceedings of the Conference of Australasian 
and Pacific Ombudsmen. 1974, pp 87-88. 
54 1st Annual Report of the Ontario Ombudsman 1975-76 
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are officers of the court - however most members of the public would 
not make such a connection and the significance of that fact for them, 
which is what is under consideration, is non-existant). It may be 
cogently argued that the court should not be involved in any kind of 
informal advice referral service - that is not their job and they are 
not equipped for it. The force of that argument is apparent but to 
argue about whether or not the activity should be pursued is not the 
point of considering it. The point is first, to notice that the 
Ombudsmen do do it and the courts do not and secondly, to guage the 
significance of it for the individual. Here is encountered a theme to 
which allusion has already been made and to which we will return. It 
is that of the personal approach and personal contact which has been 
possible and has been deliberately followed by Ombudsmen everywhere. 
Randall Ivany, Alberta's second Ombudsman who took office in 1974, 
stated the three central goals of his office to be: 






All three can be seen to be important to the Ombudsman's office being 
known for the personal touch but the goals of availability and human-
isation are especially important. In his first report the Ontario 
Ombudsman also expressed an awareness of the fact that it was important 
not to let his office develop into a bureaucracy and so become distant 
from the public, 56 and the personal humane approach of Sir Guy Powles 
while he was incumbent of the office in New Zealand is so famed as to 
be beyond the need for references. In modern, impersonal society where 
alienation abounds in many forms the existence of an official who is 
prepared not only to sit down and listen to problems and complaints, 
but also appears willing to do so on a personal level would seem to be 
almost universally accepted as a powerful and desirable attribute of 
the Ombudsman institution, and to have a beneficial impact on the lives 
of those individuals who come into contact with it. 
55 1974 Report of the Alberto Ombudsman p.5 
56 ibid n.54 supra, p. 48. However, when the elaborate office 
organisation and system of that office is considered along the 
~assive number of complaints (10,587 - it took approximately 
twelve years for New Zealand to reach that total) received in the 
first year office, I wonder how effectively they will fulfil their 
objectives. 
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(ii) Dealing with the complaint 
(a) Informality 
This factor has already been considered under the heading of basic 
differences and not much more needs be said about it except that it 
is linked to the theme of personal service. It could be explained 
from the individuals point of view by saying that when a case is 
taken to the courts you are required to play the game their way and 
if you break the rules then you bear the consequences. However, when 
you take a complaint to the Ombudsmen the requirements are not so 
strict and the rules of the game are worked out by consultation as 
the game proceeds. The informality of the Ombudsman/client relation-
ship would appear to be more attractive to individuals. 
(b) Speed 
In 1970 the Ombudsman stated,"The Ombudsman procedure should be kept 
informal, thorough and expeditious. 1157That almost amounts to a para-
phrase of the words of John Milton with which this paper began. 
Obviously, expedition is an important element in the doing of justice . 
That fact is recognised by the courts as well as the Ombudsmen. 
However, in this respect the courts are hindered by a massive and 
ever-increasing workload and by the cumbersome procedures used in 
dealing with cases (which, ironically, have been developed to ensure 
the doing of justice). The Ombudsman also noted in the 1970 report 
that the majority of cases that he dealt with were finished with in 
six to eight weeks:
8 
The Hawaiin Ombudsman, Herman Doi, quoted in 
his paper presented to the Australasian and Pacific Ombudsmen's Con-
ference in 1974 the figures of 35.73 days (i.e. approximately five 
weeks) as being the mean time in which investigated complaints were 
dealt with in the 1971-72 year, and of 42% of complaints being dealt 
with in a week, 54% being dealt with within two weeks and 69% of 
complaints being dealt with within four weeks~9 Obviously, the courts 
are in no position to compete with these kind of records. The final 
determination of a case from the time it is brought will involve months. 
It is of course clear that the courts will move with expedition where 
57 1970 Report p.9. 
58 ibid 
59 "The Work, Staffing and Administration of an Ombudsman's Office" 
opcit, p.87A. 
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special prejudice is involved, on an ex parte application if need be. 
However, that is not of much use if the action is against the crown, 
for injunctions will not issue to the crown60 and so neither will 
interim injunctions. There are no such things as interim declarations~ 1 
The applicants only hope in such a . situation is that the crown will 
facilitate the bringing of the substantive action to trial. Even if 
there has been expedition on an interlocutory matter that is no 
guarantee that the substance will be finally determined any earlier. 
It should also be noted that the Ombudsmen also have cases that drag 
on in some cases for years but they are normally as a result of 
circumstances beyond his control and not because he doesn 1 t have the 
time to deal with them. The plain fact of the matter is that the 
Ombudsmen 1 s ability to deal with a case quickly, in contrast to the 
situtation of the courts is a decided mark in his favour as far as the 
individual is concerned. A complainant whose complaint is speedily 
satisfied is more satisfied. 
(c) Cost 
This point does not need to be laboured as it is painfully obvious. 
It used to cost a complainant to the Ombudsman the crippling sum of 
one pound~ 2 The outcome of the complaint had no affect on the cost. 
Now it costs nothing to make a complaint - the service is on the tax-
payer. And the cost of taking a case to court? Who knows? Nothing 
further need be said. 
60 Crown Proceeding Act 1950 s 17. 
61 However, notice that cl.8 of the Judicature Amendment Bill (No.2) 
1977 at present before the House provides for an ame ndment to the 
Judicature Amendment Bill 1972 by substituting a news 8 including: 
"(2) Where the Crown is the respondent (or one of the respondents) 
to the application for review the Court shall not have the power to 
make any order against the Crown under paragraph (a) or paragraph 
(b) of this section; but, instead, in any such case the Court may, 
by interim order: (a) Declare that the Crown ought not to take 
any further action that is or would be consequent on the exercise 
of the statutory power or (b) Declare that the Crown ought not to 
institute or continue with any proceeding, civil or criminal, in 
connection with any matter to which the application for review 
relates." 
62 1962 Acts 13 (3) - and note even then the discretion in the 
Ombudsmen. 
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(d) Regard to personal circumstances 
The Ombudsman further commented in his 1970 Report63 that in dealing with 
cases before him he had regard to the personal circumstances of the 
complainant. It is apparent that he means by this something different 
from a consideration of the merits of the case (which will be examined 
presently) by the fact that he gives as an example the situation, "where 
personal distress is involved". He further says that, "where necessary 
the case is pressed to a very early conclusion by telephone"~4 The fact 
that the Ombudsman does this sort of thing is another aspect of the 
factor of personal dealings with individuals, and his ability to do it 
lies in the flexibility and informality of operation. The courts 
obviously do not provide such a service. However, it is not contended 
that members of the bench and court staff are totally unfeeling 
insensitive ogres. No doubt they do as much as is possible within the 
limits placed upon them by the system and heavy workloads, Nevertheless, 
they are not equipped for such a task and in this respect once again 
the Ombudsman - individual relationship comes out on top as far as the 
individual is concerned. That is even in spite of the fact that as the 
already been noted the courts may take notice of personal circumstances 
to the extent that unless they act with expedition, irreparable damage 
could ensue. 
(e) The Communication/Splanation Role - Personalising Government 
This is another aspect of the third of the goals of the Albertan 
Ombudsman~ 5 There are numerous examples scattered through the case notes in 
the Ombudsman's reports indicating different aspects of this kind of 
response which the Ombudsman makes to individual complainants. The 
basis for this response can perhaps be seen in the statute ins 24(2) 
which says: "The Ombudsman shall in any case inform the complainant, 
in such manner and at such time as he thinks proper, of the result 
of the investigation." 
That is the statutory obligation placed upon him but in practice he 
communicates more often with the complainant than just to notify him 
63 at p.9. 
64 ibid. 
65 See n.55 supra 
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of the result of the investigation. He communicates by letter, tele-
phone or in person as often as is necessary in the context of the case. 
It is safe to assert that the simple expedient of a letter is a major 
factor in carrying out of the role in the majority of cases. In such 
letters the Ombudsman is able to explain and the complainant to under-
stand, perhaps for the first tim~ for example the intricacies of import 
law requirements and the relevant departmental policy?6 Sometimes it 
involves him in establishing communication between the individual and 
the organisation involved as in the case where an elderly lady 
purchased an "own your own" unit in a block of two. At the time of 
settlement there was only one rate assessment for both units which was 
to be divided but for which the council would not issued separate 
receipts until it was so divided. However, in the following year 
arrears on the whole of the old assessment were charged to the woman 
who upon going to the council received no co-operation whatsoever. 
The Ombudsman was able to penetrate beyond obstructive clerks such 
that the complaint was completely rectified~ 7 At other stages the 
Ombudsman is required to explain events to a complainant which have 
been confusing or irritating; as in the case where a complainant was 
admitted to hospital with a drug overdose. She remembered having had 
photographs taken of her and she objected to that. Along with other 
matters the Ombudsman was able to explain to her the reasons for the 
photos and to return the negatives to her~ 8 In other cases the Ombuds-
man may simply win an apology to the complainant from the department?9 
A final aspect of this communicating role undertaken by the Ombudsmen, 
and one which is frequently used, may be called the convening function. 
This idea is to get all of the parties together for a conference so 
that effective communication can be established and any disputes can 
be solved?0 This conference technique is also used hy other Ombucismen? 1 
66 e.g. Case No. Wl0996 against the Customs Department, Reported in 
(1977) INZAR 114. 
67 Case No. Al68 Reported (1977) INZAR 152. See also a similar case 
which involved a communication breakdown - 1973 Report, p.49, Case 
No. 7123. 
68 1972 Report, p.47, Case No. 6550. 69 1964 Report, p.62, Case No. 662. 
70 See e.g. 1964 Report, p.36, Case No. 897; 1972 Report, p.69, Case 
No. 6237; 1976 Report, p.27, Case Nos. 9405, 9606. 
71 e.g. South Australia; See GD Combe, Ombudsman, South Australia, 
"Characteristics of Complaint Investigation Against Government 
Departments, Statutory Authorities and Local Authorities". Proceedings 
of the Conference of Australasian and Pacific Ombudsmen, 1974, p.123. 
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This kind of response is not really discernible in the courts. 
Certainly, it is not actively promoted. This is obviously under-
standable when it is remembered that the courts employ the adversarial 
approach to problem elucidation and determination. The parties are 
primed for a contest rather than a conference. It may be that the 
threat of court proceedings acts as a negative inducement come to 
some kind of settlement by conferring rather than by contesting. 
(f) Producing results 
Although all of the responses that have been considered so far and 
which are particularly attributes of the Ombudsman institution may 
be seen as attractive and desirable in the eyes of the individual 
complainant and as significant advantages of the institution over 
the courts, the fact is that the complainant doesn't go to the 
Ombudsman just so that he can have the edifying experience of being 
treated as a human being and having his problem dealt with exped-
itiously and cheaply. He is primarily interested in results. In this 
area at least the courts are not left out in the cold. Whenever they 
have a case before them they are faced with a situation of conflict 
and they are equipped to resolve that conflict justly, in accordance 
with the law and the facts as they are presented. When they come to a 
conclusion on a case, even if it has been a long and costly process, a 
result is produced one way or the other. It is unlikely to leave all 
parties entirely happy, but, nevertheless, its decision is to be 
followed. What then of the Ombudsmen and their lack of coercive powers? 
Are they just all nice frills with no practical usefulness? The over-
whelming answer is no. Their success rate has been quite startling. 
Larry Hill in his book on the New Zealand Ombudsman, "The Model Ombudsman" 
notes that up to the 31st March 1975 only two among the total cases in 
which recommendations had been made, had not been implemented. 72 However, 
he does footnote this comment by saying, "(The Ombudsman) often has 
considerable latitude about whether or not to provoke a confrontation 
and he uses his political skill to avoid unnecessary clashes". 73 
72 "The Model Ombudsman", opcit n.9 supra at pp 192-3. In the two 
reporting years subse~uent to that date, there do not appear to be 
any further recommendations not implemented, except to the extent 
that some had not been actioned by the time of the report. 
73 ibid p.193 n.5. 
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This point cannot be ignored because if the Ombudsman become so cowed 
by obstinate administrators that in order to be effective when they 
can they reduce the number of times that they make recommendations, 
then the significance of pointing to high success rate is considerably 
reduced. It is further necessary to note the comments of New Zealand's 
most recently appointed Ombudsman when he is reported as saying, in 
addressing the Lower Hutt City Council, that "precious few" of the 
Ombudsmen's decisions had not been accepted by local bodies? 4 That 
comment may signify that in the local body field of investigation 
discussion and persuasion based on a thorough case are not proving 
to be as effective as they have been in the central government field. 
Professor Hill, in the course of his extensive survey of the Ombudsman 
institution in New Zealand has demonstrated a very significant fact 
about the responses involved in the Ombudsman/client relationship. He 
was aware that the Ombudsman helped his clients in many ways, some of 
which have already been discussed. He examined what this help meant in 
material terms for the clients. To do so he applied a strict definition 
of the term "helped", viz, "clients are said to be helped only if as a 
result of their complaint some material circumstance has been altered in 
their favour 11 ?5 
When he applied that definition to the complainants comprising his sample 
(which was a representative cross section of all complaints received up 
to the time of the survey, but with complaints against non scheduled 
organisation removed) he found that 16% of the Ombudsman's clients were 
"helped 11 ?6 When he compared those that were helped against the case 
classifications to which they had been assigned by the Ombudsmen (i.e. 
"declined", "withdrawn", "discontinued", "not justified") he found that 
none of those complaints that had been declined had been "helped" and, 
not surprisingly, he found that complaints which had been classified as 
justified comprised the majority of those that were "helped", in fact 
they made up 52%. Complaints classified as discontinued accounted for 
another 28.8% of those ''helped" and the most significant thing is that 
those complaints classified as not justified and withdrawn made up 9.6% 
each of those complainants who had been helped according to his definition? 7 
The importance of this is perhaps not able to be grasped in the midst of 
74 L J Castle - Reported in Evening Post, 23rd August 1977. 
75 "The Model Ombudsman" opcit p.194. 
76 ibid p.196. 
77 ibid. 
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percentages but it is clear that the effectiveness of the Ombudsman 
in securing beneficial results for the people who complain to him 
cannot be evaluated merely on his classification of the cases. Although 
examples of cases where complainants have been helped, but whose cases 
have not been classified as justified do not abound in the reports they 
can be found. For instance, the case can be cited where a motel pro-
prietor had had (on erroneous advice from the Post Office) separate 
telephones installed in each unit of his motel. He was somewhat 
disturbed to find that (contrary to the received advice) he was charged 
for the phones at business rates. The regulations in question, however, 
regulations 11 & 12 of the Teleprone Regulations 1968 made it quite 
clear that the business rate was the appropriate rate for telephones 
installed in motels. Had the complainant known this he would have had a 
system of extension phones installed rather than separate lines for each 
unit, which would have made the cost cheaper. The Ombudsman therefore 
felt that, should the complainant wish to change the system installed, 
then the costs of the reinstallation should be set off against the costs 
of the original installation. Consequently, although the complainant was 
classified as not justified it paved the way for the complainant to pay 
less overall rates than what he was paying at the time of the complaint 
and to achieve that with the substantial costs to be borne by the Post 
Office'. 8 It would be pure conjecture as to whether the courts helped 
parties before them in this way even when the case goes against the party 
in question. It is conceivable that they could but my guess if that if 
it did happen it would not be frequently so. 
Consequently, there is on one hand the Ombudsmen who have a high success 
rate in getting results for their clients when the complaint is found to 
be of substance and also in some cases where the complaint itself is not 
justified, or the investigation is not completed for one reason or another, 
but nevertheless some benefit accrues to the complainant; but whose 
recommendations are not always accepted, and who may temper their activity 
according to some kind of political commonsense. On the other hand there 
are the courts who when the facts and the law warrant it are able to 
78 1976 Report, p.37, Case No . 9662. See also 1977 Report, p.17, Case 
No. Wll041 where the complaint was classified as not justified; and 
1972 Report, p.100, Case No. 6660, where the investigation was dis-
continued. 
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produce a result beneficial to the plaintiff/applicant. But, it is to 
be noted, the law must warrant it, and as Lord Devlin has said, "I 
believe it to be generally recognised that in many of his dealings 
with the executive the citizen cannot get justice by process of law. 
The common law has now, I think, no longer the strength to provide any 
satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping the executive with all 
the powers which under modern conditions are needed for the efficient 
conduct of the realm, under proper control 11: 9 
That statement was made over twenty years ago, and there have been some 
very important developments in administrative law since then, but never-
theless there are many areas of modern government with respect to which 
the substantive law is not sufficiently developed and remedies are 
cumbersome and inappropriate (to say nothing of the procedures); in the 
light of the complexity, speed and pervasiveness of the governmental 
processes, for effective supervision to be carried out and for justice 
to be done. 
(g) The grounds upon which results are based. 
In 1971 the Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee in its 
Fourth Report summarised the grounds upon which the Courts will review 
80 administrative action by quoting from an article by Professor J F Northey. 
It said, "First, that the action or decision is ultra vires. 
Second, that an error of law has been disclosed on the face 
of the record of the tribunal making the decision. 
Third, that there has been a breach of the principles of 
natural justice." 81 
79 Lord Devlin, "The Common Law. Public Policy and the Executive", 
1956 9 Current Legal Problems, 1 at p .14, quoted by Sir Guy Powles 
in Aspects of the Search for Administrative Justice: With Particular 
Reference to the New Zealand Ombudsman", opcit n.2 at p.133. 
80 "An Additional Remedy in Administrative Law" [1970) N.Z.L.J. 202. 
81 Fourth Report of the Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee 
at p. 7. 
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In saying that a ground of challenge was that of "ultra vires" the 
Committee was using a somewhat compe dious phrase which includes such 
matters as jurisdictional error, questions as to delegation and sub-
ordinate legislation, and abuse of discretion. It may also be necessary 
to add to that list as a ground of review the duty to act fairl/ 2 As 
yet however, it is a doctrine of uncertain import, scope and content 
an~~Ymay be merely an extension of the third ground summarised - the 
principles of natural justice. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the intricacies 
of the substantive law. Answers to questions like "v/hat is meant by 
jurisdiction?", "What is an error of law?", "What constitutes the record?'' 
and "When is there an obligation to act in accordance with the principles 
of natural justice or a duty to act fairly?" are not certain in the law
83 
and an examination of them in detail requires recourse to a textbook~
4 
The grounds upon which an Ombudsman can act in relation to a complaint are 
contained ins 22(1) & (2) of the Act. It says: 
"(1) The provisions of this section shall apply in every 
case where, after making any investigation under this Act, 
an Ombudsman is of opinion that that the decision, recom-
mendation, act or ommission which was the subject-matter 
of the investigation -
(a) Appears to have been contrary to law; or 
(b) Was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly 
discriminatory, or was in accordance with a rule of law or 
a provision of any Act, regulation, or bylaw or a practice 
that is or may be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or impro-
perly discriminatory; or 
(c) Was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; 
or 
(d) Was wrong" 
82 See e.g. In re H.K. (An Infant) [1967] 2QB 617; Lower Hutt City 
Council v Bank [1974] INZLR 545; Dunlop v Woollarhra Municipal 
Council [1975] 2 NSWLR 446. 
83 For a classic example of the confusion see~ v Southampton Justices, 
Ex parte Green [1976] 1 Q.B. 11. 
84 See SA de Smith, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", opcit 
n. 11. 
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"(2) The provisions of this section shall also apply 
in any case where an Ombudsman is of opinion that in 
the making of the decision or recommendation, or in the 
doing or ommission of the act, a discretionary power has 
been exercised for an improper purpose or on irrelevant 
grounds or on the taking into account of irrelevant con-
siderations, or that, in the case of a decision made in 
the exercise of any discretionary power, reasons should 
have been given for the decision." 
Even a quick perusal of the subsections reveal that the grounds upon 
which an Ombudsman can act are similar in may respects to those upon 
which the courts can act. For instances 22(1) (a) appears to cover 
similar grounds to ultra vires grounds used by the courts whether it 
be concerned with jurisdictional error or abuse of discretion or sub-
ordinate legislation ultra vires the principal legislation under which 
it is made. However, it is also obvious that an Ombudsman can act in 
situations where the courts cannot. 
Ultra vires 
It is clear that the courts will prevent a statutory authority from 
acting in excess of its statutory power. In the Ombudsman's work this 
ground seems to have manifested itself in two ways in particular. The 
first can be seen in the Ombudsman's trenchant criticism of the practice 
of some department to operate a policy which is in conflict with 
regulations which the department is supposed to be administrating. 
Instead of promulgating a change in the regulations they choose to 
ignore them~ 5 The courts similarly will accept no such behaviour from 
the executive as is graphically illustrated by the recent case of 
Fitzgerald v Muldoon~6 Neither the courts nor the Ombudsmen will tolerate 
the Executive attempting to act in derogation or in disregard of statutes. 
The second category is perhaps more in line with what the courts recognise 
as traditional ultra vires activity. In Shand v Minister of Railways 87it 
was said in the joint judgement of North P. and Turner J., when discussing 
85 See e.g. 1965 Report, p.27, Case No. 898(b); 1967 Report, p.21, Case 
no. 2364; 1972 Report, pp 18-19. 
86 [1976) 2 NZLR 615. 
87 [1970) NZLR 615. 
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a statutory power: 
"It if, we think, p rfectly plain that this et ion 
onfers on the Minis t r the power to 01ne to an admi ni s-
Lrativ d cision and issue an ex cuLive order. When such 
a power is on f rr d on a Mini t r of th Crown we are of 
the opinion that as long as h r acts within the cope of 
his statutory paw r and acts in a bona fide manner in 
x rci ing the power, his d cision cannot b call din 
qu Lion in a Court of law ... 1188 
In other word , Lhe c ntral Lask of Lhe courts when they are faced 
with ultra vir s claims i Latutory inL rpr taLion - they must d t r-
min wh ther the tatuLory pararn L rs hav b en omplied with. The 
same pro ess can b een in the work of the Ornbud m n. ror example, 
in a ase r port din 1974 the Ornbud man came to th conclusion Lhat 
Lhe pracLi of the J1rnnigraLion divi ion of the D parLm nt of Labour to 
require th signing of an undertaking by r latives of vi itors to the 
country, that no application for an xt nsion of the permit would be 
mad , was unlawful in terms of the Immigration /\et 1964. The right to 
apply for uch an ext nsion is expr ssly conf rr d by th Act. It i 
to b noticed Lhat Lh languag of the Ombud man i not uniform in thi 
fi ld and he ertainly do sn't speak in terms of vir s. In a case in 
1970 where th re wa a failure by the d partment concern d to notify the 
complainant of a right of appeal under th Act, the Ombudsman after 
having regard d the purpose and structure of the legislation, as well as 
om r levant external factors, cam to the conclusion that the d partment 
failur was "wrong" under s 19(1) (d) of the 1962 Act. 0 In 1976 in a 
case cone rned with the public us of a right of way around Lake Taupo, 
and th paw r of th Governor-Gen ral under th statute to ex mpt any 
parL of th right of way from public u e by pro lamation, Lhe Ombudsman had 
occasion to question wheth r a proclamation in 1974 r stricting the right 
of way Lo six m tr in width wa contrary to law or ba d upon a mistak 
of law. 11 came to th cone l u ion that th re comm nda t ion mad by the 
d parLment wa "unreasonable and wrong and appeared to be contrary to law. "91 
88 ibid a p. 4. 
8 J 74 Rc1ort, p. 5, c ·s Sc al J 72 R por, p.74, Cas 
N . 188, p.78, dS No. R por , p.25, C No. 9J. 
0 
al 
d cision invalid. 
1 1 7 Ropor , p.27, Cs Nos. 405 & o 
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The reasons for this lack of uniformity are partly because the Ombudsman 
isn't required to fit his conclusion into some neat judicial formulation 
by precedent, but probably largely due to the flexibility which his 
statute provides him with. Of course it may also be that he does find 
several grounds upon which to base his opinion. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that that Ombudsman can and does base results in favour of his 
clients on what may loosely be termed as vires grounds. 
The Shand case and the Lake Taupo case point out something which should 
be noted in respect of the Ombudsmen's challenge of the exercise of 
statutory powers. Shand's case concerned the decision of a Minister and 
the Lake Taupo case the issuing of a proclamation by the Governor-General. 
The implication in the Ombudsmen Act is clear that the Ombudsmen are not 
free to challenge the decisions of Ministers, let alone orders of the 
Governor-General, and this has been adhered to in practice. Yet it will 
be noted that the Ombudsman came to a conclusion of wrongness and unlaw-
fulness in the Taupo case; but it was not in respect of the Governor-
General's proclamation as such. Rather he attacked the recommendation of 
the department, upon which the proclamation was based. In the event the 
proclamation was revoked. Effectively, the Ombudsman had declared it 
ultra vires. Had the Minister in Shand based his decision on recommend-
ations of the department which were not in accordance with the law, the 
same approach could have been taken by an Ombudsman in attacking the 
decision. His statute expressly allows that~ 2 Consequently, the apparent 
limitation on the Ombudsmen's ability to challenge the exercise of stat-
utory authority by ministers is in effect not as extensive as it first 
seems. However, there will be occasions where a Minister acts without 
considering any departmental advice, which the courts may be able to 
declare ultra vires, but which the Ombudsman is precluded from attacking. 
Abuse of Discretion 
In applying the ultra vires concept part of the task of the courts is to 
control the abuse of discretion. Professor de Smith, in summarising the 
principles which govern the exercise of discretionary powers, says, 
"The authority in which a discretion is vested can be 
compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise 
it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion 
92 s 13 (2). 
- 34 -
must be exercised only by the authority to which it is 
committed. That authority must genuinely address itself 
to the matter before it: it must not act under the 
dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising 
a discretion in each individual case. In the purported 
exercise of its discretion it must not do what it had been 
forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been 
authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have 
regard to all relevant considerations and must not be 
swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to 
promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of 
the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not 
act arbitrarily or capriciously. 1193 
Support for those propositions can be found in numerous cases scattered 
throughout the reports. For the purposes of this paper it is useful to 
cite Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food~ 4 with 
respect to compelling the exercise of a discretion and the question of 
relevancy of considerations; ~ v P.L.A., ex parte Kynoch Ltd~ 5 concern-
ing the unlawful fettering of the exercise of a discretion; and Police 
v Gapes 96 regarding improper purpose influencing a discretion. From the 
first days of the office in New Zealand the Ombudsman has waged a battle 
against the abuse of discretion by officials. He has been particularly 
concerned with the fettering of discretion. In his 1964 Report97 he 
reaffirmed what he had stated in his 1963 Report; namely, that care was 
to be taken in the exercise of a discretion and the special circumstances 
of each case were to be considered, that the exercise of the discretion 
was not to be bound by guidelines or rules that had been laid down. He 
noted that achieving this was made difficult by the high degree of dele-
gation involved in running the day to day affairs of governmental depart-
ments. That being the case the Ombudsman recommended that those who 
delegated discretionary powers should act with care in drawing up the 
rules and guidelines by which they were to be exercised and that the 
delegates should not be bound by any rules or guidelines when it was 
appropriate to exercise discretion according to the merits of the 
93 de Smith, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", opcit n.11 
supra at pp. 252-3. 
94 [1968] A.C. 997. 
95 [19]9] lK.B. 176. 
96 Unreported decision of Mr Sinclair S.M., Auckland, 7 November 1966. 
97 at p.5. 
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particular case in hand. When this kind of approach is compared with 
that in the oft quoted words of Bankes L.J. in Kynochs case when he 
said, 
"There are on one hand cases where a tribunal in the 
honest exercise of its discretion has adopted a policy, 
and, without refusing to hear an applicant, intimates 
to him what its policy is, and that after hearing him 
it will in accordance with its policy decide against 
him, unless there is something exceptional in his case 
... if the policy has been adopted for reasons which the 
tribunal may legitimately entertain, no objection could 
be taken to such a course. On the other hand, there are 
cases where a tribunal has passed a rule or come to a 
determination, not to hear any application of a particular 
character by whomsoever made. There is a wide distinction 
to be drawn between these two classes"~ 8 
obvious similarities are perceivable. However, although there are many 
cases in the Ombudsman's Reports which can be seen to be exactly on a 
par with Lord Justice Bankes' formulation99 there are others that go 
beyond it. In such cases the Ombudsman, while deprecating the fettering 
of the discretion in question, sometimes does what de Smith says the courts 
cannot do. He examines the merits of decisions and comes to a conclusion 
one way or another about what the result should have been according to 
some sense of fairness, then recommends that the department should exercise 
its discretion to achieve that result. Often this process is not explicit 
in the Ombudsman's reasoning as it is reported in the case notes. However, 
some examples can be cited. For instance one complaint concerned a chimney 
which was damaged in an earthquake, but the damage was not discovered until 
two months after the event. A claim was made to the Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission which refused the claim as it had been made after the 
thirty day time limit on claims, even though it had a discretion to accept 
late claims. The Ombudsman was concerned that the regulations under which 
the Commission acted were unjust and unfair. As well as that though he 
felt that his complainants claim should have been accepted which meant that 
98 Kynoch's opcit n. (95) at p. 184. See also Isitt v Quill (1893) 
IINZLR 224 at 249, 257; Hamilton City v Electricity Distribution 
and Others [1972) NZLR 605, 634; Turner v Allison [1971) NZLR 832 
at pp 842-3, 847, 849, 854. 
99 1963 Report, p.10, Case No. 326; 1968 Report, p.9; 1973 Report, 
p.49, Case No. 7123. 
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the Commission should have exercised its discretion in her favour. The 
CoflllTlission did reconsider and came to a decision favourable to the com-
plainant~00 Another case in which the Ombudsman became impressed with the 
merits of the complainants' cases was that concerning seventy medical 
students who for various reasons were, unless the Director-General of 
Education exercised his discretion in their favour, in a position of 
having to complete their studies without bursary assistance. Although the 
Director-General asserted that he had already exercised his discretion 
liberally (and here there did not seem to be any particular suggestion by 
the Ombudsman of objectionable fettering) he was nevertheless persuaded 
by the Ombudsman in relation to a considerable number of the cases that 
bursary assistance should be granted for an additional year. The point is 
that the Ombudsman didn't merely come to the conclusion that the Director 
-General had unnecessarily restricted the exercise of his discretion or 
that he had exercised it on irrelevant considerations and then direct him 
to exercise it again properly. He persuaded the Director-General to change 
his mind by reference to the particular facts of each case : the woman who 
had qualified as a nurse, a midwife and in theology and then returned to 
school to get University Entrance, before studying for a degree in medicine, 
and who was ''deserving of special consideration on the grounds of effort 
alone", the student who had already graduated with a M.Sc. (1st class 
honours) and a Ph.D. 101 Other examples that appear in the case notes 
can also be cited~02 The Ombudsman also challenged the exercise of discretion 
where it has been done in pursuance of an improper purpose or on irrelevant 
grounds or where irrelevant considerations have been taken into account. 
There is, for example, a case in 1972 where, owing to proposed stop-work 
meetings by teachers in two secondary schools, the Board of Governors of 
the schools lawfully decided to close the schools on the half-days in 
question. This action required the rearrangement of the school bus time-
tables. However, the local education board refused to consent to such a 
rearrangement and it was clear that in doing this it was acting at the 
behest of the Department of Education. The Ombudsman concluded that 'the 
department was wrong in declining to permit that rearrangement", but that 
as the schools had closed and had had to make special transport arrange-
ments he could do nothing but stress that the department must,"act strictly 
in accordance with proper and relevant considerations, and not be moved by 
100 1970 Report, p.75, Case No. 4332. 
101 1971 Report, p.30, Case No. 5079. 
102 e .. 1964 Report, p.28, Case No. 469; 1967 Report, p.16, Case No. 1751 
(the persistent Naval officer's widow case); and note the interesting 
comments made in 1975 Report, p.22, Case No. 9292. 
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extraneous factors" .103 
In Padfields case Lord Upjohn said: 
"Unlawful behaviour by the Minister may be stated with 
sufficient accuracy for the purposes of the present 
appeal ... (a) by an outright refusal to consider the 
relevant matter, or (b) by misdirecting himself in 
point of law, or (c) by taking into account some wholly 
irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or (d) by 
wholly omitting to take into account a relevant con-
sideration. 11104 
It is apparent from this, and from the decision of Mr Sinclair S.M. 
in Police v Gapes 105 (where he found an improper purpose on the part 
of the Minister of Marine who was also the Minister of Broadcasting 
and who wished to prevent a pirate radio station from beginning broad-
casting and did so by placing a detention order on the ship from which 
the station was to operate, allegedly on the grounds that the ship was 
unsafe to put to sea) that the courts and the Ombudsman act on similar 
pr inciples in this area. It would also seem apparent that the courts 
and the Ombudsmen are both somewhat hampered when their review is con-
ducted ex post facto. In the Education Department case discussed above 
the Ombudsman was unable to do anything to help the schools board 
(although perhaps he could have recommended that the Department reim-
bursed the schools 1 board if it had incurred any expense in making 
special arrangements - which would appear to be in keeping with the 
Ombudsman 1 s approach in other cases) and it is clear from the cases of 
Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd106and Takaro Properties Ltd (in receiver-
ship) and Another v Rowling 107 that the courts are unable to grant relief 
from damage incurred as a result of an abuse of discretion unless the 
abuse constitutes a recognised actionable wrong. 108 
103 1972 Report, p.29, Case No. 5804. See also 1969 Report, p . 93 , 
Case No. 3838; 1965 Report, p.38, Case No. 1665. 
104 opc it, n.94 at p.1020. 
105 opcit, n.96. 
106 (1975) 2NZLR 62. 
107 (1976) 2NZLR 657. 
108 This question will be considered mo re closely when the kind of results 
produced are noted. 
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Natural Justice and Fairness 
As has already been pointed out there is some difficulty in this area 
of the law and although some things would appear to be clear it is 
nevertheless the case that the courts are still feeling their way in 
it; particularly in the area of what can be termed the doctrine of 
procedural fairness and its relationship to natural justice. Although 
it is not the purpose of this paper to examine the intricacies of this 
exploration being undertaken by the courts, it may be said, though not 
with complete certainty, that, in the words of Wootten J. in Dunlop 
v Wooll ahra Municipal Council :109 
11 The functions traditionally (even if often inappro-
priately as a matter of terminology) classified as 
'judicial I or 'quasi-judicial I attract the rules of 
natural justice (including the two traditional duties 
and other duties arising from an overall duty of fair-
ness). Other administrative functions not so class-
ified attract a duty to act fairly. This seems to be 
the formulation of Lord Pearson in Pearlberg v Varty 
llO 
(1972) lWLR 534, 537. I I 
A judicial or quasi-judicial function is to be discerned by construing 
the statutory provisions in question and then by considering three 
factors which act as pointers as to the nature of the function: 
Durayappah v Fernando. 111 In that case Lord Upjohn said that the three 
factors were, 
"first, what is the nature of the property, the office 
held, status enjoyed or services to be performed by 
the complainant of injustice. Secondly, in what cir-
cumstances or upon what occasions is the person claim-
ing to be entitled to exercise the measure of control 
entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to inter-
vene is proved, what sactions in fact is the latter 
entitled to impose upon the other. 11 ll 2 
109 U97~ 2NSWLR 446. 
110 ibid at p.472. 
111 [1967] 2A.C. p.337. 
112 ibid at p.349. 
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If a consideration of these factors lead to a conclusion that some 
kind of judicial function is involved then a duty to act according 
to the principles of natural justice arises. The "two traditional 
duties" are those of audi alteram partem - the right to be heard (which 
also would normally involve a right to know the charges which are to be 
answered), and of nemo judex in causa sua - the right to be judged with 
a freedom from bias. The content of these duties as applied to a 
particular situation depends upon the characteristics of that situation~13 
In a similar manner the question of the content of a duty to act fairly 
will depend upon the occasion on which it is said to arise. 114 
A consideration of the Ombudsman's case notes makes it clear that he 
too requires principles of fairness and natural justice to be observed 
by the bodies over which he has jurisdiction. The fact that Sir Guy 
Powles was trained in the law (as are all three of New Zealand's present 
Ombudsmen) would seem to indicate a distinct possibility that in dealing 
with the cases before him, he would take cognizance of the principles 
recognised and applied by the law. This possibility has to some extent 
materialised in practice in that sometimes in his reports he talks about 
the justice of the situation requiring a hearing or that as a matter of 
fairness notice should have been given. In 1965 he enumerated, as one 
of "three broad avenues leading to administrative justice", " ... the granting 
of a fair hearing to a potentially aggrieved person." 116 In 1968 in talking 
of the basic procedured requirements necessary to satisfy the claims of 
justice he said: 
"the substance of the matter is the provision of the 
opportunity to present the case adequately, rather 
than the form of presentation." 
It is difficult to analyse in each situation whether he was talking of 
what in law would be called natural justice or of fairness. The matter 
is not one of great significance because although the Ombudsman's term-
inology is not consistent it is clear that he determines whether there is 
a duty to provide some kind of procedural safeguards, as well as what 
those safeguards should be in a particular situation, in the light of the 
113 Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949) lAll E.R. 109. 
114 See e.g. Dunlop's case ibid at p.471; Selvarajan v Race Relations 
Board [1976] lAll E.R. 12 per Lord Denning M.R. at p.19 . 
115 1965 Report p.5 . 
116 1968 Report p. 6. 
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circumstances of the case in question. In a case concerning regulations 
as to the disciplining of teachers he considered that the charge should 
be written and there should be a right to a hearing before an impartial 
investigator;117 in a case concerning objections to a scheme, which, it 
was alleged, would cause the flooding of the objectors farms, a ''mani-
festly unbiased" tribunal was required;118 a body with a financial interest 
should not have been a judge;119 in a case which involved property interests, 
it was sufficient that eventually the complainant became full appraised of 
the case they had to answer, and had their answer in response considered 
- a hearing as such was unnecessary;120 the ability to alter the incidence 
of rates without notice and consultation was not acceptable .121 These cases 
reveal nothing startling but show the similarity of the Ombudsmen's 
approach to that of the courts. However, one case calls for further con-
sideration.122 It concerned attempts by the Department of Education to 
acquire land for the further development of a Teachers College campus. 
The complainant wanted the department to inform the residents of the land 
neighbouring the college what its designs were in respect to that land. 
The department argued in reply that any publicity of its proposals had to 
await Government approval of them; that it was the Government's decision 
as to what publicity should be given; that there could be no consultation 
with residents in anticipation of Government approval when that might not 
be given; that consultation was impractical in the context of continuous 
planning and replanning; and that in any case the procedures provided under 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 were sufficient to provide for 
appropriate public involvement. The Ombudsman rejoined by asserting that 
had there been consultation from the beginning the situation of mistrust 
which then obtained would have been averted. He went on to say that the 
doctrine that the Crown could do no wrong had to be balanced against a 
positive responsibility, "to be fair, open, honest and above-board in 
dealing with those affected and to give most sympathetic consideration to 
the wishes and interests of those persons.'~23The department obtained a 
ministerial decision on the matter before the Ombudsman had completed his 
117 1964 Report, p.30, Case No. 829. 
118 1964 Report, p.74, Case Nos. 365 ~ 641. 
119 1969 Report, p.93, Case No. 3838. 
120 1968 Report, p.36, Case No. 3328. 
121 1977 Report, p.37, Case No. Al4. 
122 1976 Report, p.17, Case No. 9757. 
123 ibid at p.19. 
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investigation (to which he reacted indignantly - and justifiably so) 
so his recommendations were to no effect. The significant point is 
that the Ombudsman stongly advocated some kind of procedural fairness 
requirement in respect of people who were likely to be affected by 
subsequent decisions, at an early stage of governmental polciy formu-
lation and planning. It is obvious that this is far beyond what the 
courts have been prepared to assert as situations where procedural 
fairness is applicable. It remains to be seen whether this approach 
is developed at all by the present Ombudsmen, especially in the light 
of the concluding comments of the case note where the Ombudsman said 
that he was, 
"continuing to give consideration to the wider question 
of whether existing procedures for the acquisition of 
land by the Crown could and should be modified to bring 
them more into line with my own views. 11124 
However, it is probably significant that the department rode roughshod 
over the involvement of the Ombudsman in this case. 
Error of Law 
Short of delving into a mass of confused case law on this matter it is 
only profitable to note that the Ombudsmen can challenge a decision if 
it is contrary to law or based upon a mistake of law. Although there 
is to some extent a blurring of the distinction between jurisidictional 
and non-jurisdictional errors in the case law, 125 it is still relatively 
safe to assert that an error of law must appear on the face of the 
record before a court can review it unless the error goes to jurisdiction. 
By contrast, the Ombudsmen have no such restriction placed on them. They 
are not bound to the contents of any "record'' of the decision, or alter-
natively, it may be viewed in the light that for Ombudsmen the record is 
all the documents relating to the case which are still extant - considering 
124 ibid at p.20. 
125 Especially if one considers the formulation of Lord Reids in Anisminic 
v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969) 2A.C. 147 at 171 as to what 
constitutes a juridictional error. See also the different approaches 
taken in R v Southampton Justices, Ex parte Green [1976) lR.B.11. 
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that he has access to all the departmental files on the matter. 
Failure to Give Reasons 
It is to be remembered that the Ombudsmen 1 s powers as to the making of 
reports and recommendations under s 22(3) also apply to situations where 
a decision is made in the exercise of a discretionary power and the 
Ombudsman is of opinion that reasons should have been given for the 
opinion~ 26 On the basis of this provision it can be said that the 
Ombudsmen can act in an area of adminstrative activity where the courts 
do not. The courts have never held that there is a general duty to give 
reasons for decisions. However, the effect of dicta in Padfields case 
indicate that they may be moving towards some such position. In response 
to the argument that if no reasons were given then the Minister 1 s decision 
could not be challenged so that it would therefore be unfortunate if by 
giving reasons he was put in a worse position, Lord Reid, for example, 
said, 
11 ... I do not agree that a decision cannot be questioned 
if no reasons are given. If it is the Minister 1 s duty 
not to act so as to frustrate the policy and objects of 
the Act, and if it were to appear from all the circum-
stances of the case that that has been the effect of the 
Minister 1 s refusal, then it appears to me that the court 
must be entitled to act. 11127 
Unless the decider is very good at covering the real reasons for his 
decision, such c position appears to render pointless the omission to 
give reasons for a decision. Nevertheless, there is still a distinction 
between the two institutions in that there is a positive power in the 
Ombudsmen to seek reasons for decisions made pursuant to a discretion. 
Hrong Decisions, the Merits of the Case and the Equity of the Case 
If an Ombudsman is of opinion that a decision, recommendation, act or 
omission was wrong then he is empowered to take action in respect of 
126 s 22(2) 
127 Padfields case opcit n.94 at pp 1032-3. 
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it. The obvious question to ask is, "What is encompassed by the word 
'wrong'?" A plain interpretation of the word would suggest that 
'factually wrong' was within its ambit, and it may even be that 'morally 
wrong' is included also. It has been noted that the Ombudsman does 
characterise some of the activity the subject of complaints to him as 
wrong. 128 It was similarly noted that the Ombudsman hasreached such a 
conclusion after the consideration of the facts of the case in the light 
of which he comes to his own view of what the decision, or whatever, should 
have been. 129 The courts, by comparison, are clearly precluded from examin-
ing the merits of a decision when they are exercising their supervisory 
reviewing jurisdiction. They are only concerned to review whether the 
decision has been reached according to law and not whether the decision 
was right or not. 130 Thus it appears that here is an area where the Ombuds-
men exercise supervision over governmental activity of a particular kind 
which the courts are unable to do. However, the Ombudsmen have not exercised 
this supervision with gay abandon and gone about trying to substitute their 
views of an acceptable result for those of governmental officials whenever 
the urge may have taken them. Indeed, as Professor Keith has demonstrated131 
there are a number of contexts in which the Ombudsman has been circumspect 
in his review of the results of administrative decisions. In concluding his 
examination of these contexts he said: 
"Basic to the scope of review within this discretionary 
area is a conflict between two principles which were 
mentioned earlier: an independent official, reviewing 
administrative decisions, is needed in today's complex 
society, but the administrator, cognisant of the facts 
and the procedural, institutional, and policy framework, 
and responsible for implementing the decision, is often 
best qualified to decide. Whether one or other of these 
principles is preferred in a particular case is likely 
to depend, . . . , on a number of factors such as: the 
generality of the issue and its ramifications (Will 
others, not immediately involved, be affected? Is a 
128 See the discussion of ultra vires and abuse of discretion, supra. 
See also 1964 Report, p.32, Case Nos.10 & 334 (the flouridation 
cases); 1972 Report, p.29, Case No. 5804; 1976 Report, p.27, Case 
Nos. 9405 & 9606. 
129 1967 Report, p.16, Case No. 1751; 1972 Report, p.26, Case No. 5362; 
1977 Report, p.39, Case N~ Al68; Case No. A23, reported at (1977) 
lNZAR p.128. 
130 See e.g. Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948) 1 K.B. 223 at pp. 228, 234. 
131 K J Keith, opcit, n.13 at p.225. 
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positive programme over a broad area being called for? 
Will an increased general expenditure result?); whether 
appropriate principles for the exercise of a discretion 
have been carefully worked out and properly applied; 
whether the judgement involved in the decision is a 
professional one or one involving complicated or disputed 
facts which the Ombudsman is not competent or able to 
question; and whether the matter has already had a full 
and careful consideration at the appropriate levels of 
government. 11132 
The Ombudsmen, in reviewing the facts of a case is obviously going to 
have regard to its particular merits; just as they have enjoined the 
departments to do. The fact that this naturally happens has lead to 
the d~velopment of the doctrine of an equitable claim to an ex gratia 
payment, which is noted by Geoffrey Sawer. 133 However, an examination of 
the case notes shows that the Ombudsman has developed an approach which 
is wider than an equitable claim to an ex gratia payment. It extends to 
the equities of the case which may lead to any manner of remedy. It is 
true that the Ombudsmen have most often found an equity to an ex gratia 
payment to exist. Examples can be multiplied. 134 One case involved a 
company in protracted negotiations and considerable cost toward providing 
a specially designed building for the housing of the National Film Studios. 
Inadequate liaison between the government departments concerned meant that 
in the end Cabinet did not grant approval for the building. Although all 
of the money expended was not recovered ( or recoverable) the Ombudsman con-
cluded that the equities of the case required some compensation to be paid 
and an ex gratia payment of $4000 was made. 135 At the other end of the scale 
the woman who incurred a solicitor's fee of $15, because an obstructive clerk 
prevented her from sorting out her incorrect rate assessment, was entitled 
to a reimbursement of the fee by the city council. 136 The Ombudsmen have 
132 ibid at pp. 392-3. 
133 G Sawer, opcit, n.13 at p.225 
134 E.g. 1965 Report, p.49, Case No. 1026; p.58, Case No. 623; 1968 
Report, p.27, Case No. 3148; 1972 Report, p.26, Case No. 5362. 
135 1970 Report, p.80, Case No. 3947. 
136 1977 Report, p.39, Case No. Al68. 
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also considered that complainants have had equitable claims to have a 
debit remitted; 137 to have a special licence to run a Child Care Centre 
granted where stipulated criteria for the issue of an ordinary licence 
were not met; 138 to have, in the case where a Maori community had donated 
some land for a specified case, the land returned to it when it fell 
redundant, despite the fact that in the interim it had been declared 
crown land; 139 and to have, among other things, a fence erected in order 
to protect privacy, when the department developed a subdivision on 
neighbouring land. 14° Clearly, this activity of the Ombudsmen is beyond 
the scope of the courts work in its supervisory capacity. 
Change in Law or Practice 
The fact that the Ombudsmen have an express power to recommend changes 
in the law or in practice where they consider that law or practice is 
or may be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory 
has already been discussed, 141 and it was then noted that the courts 
also have some effect in this area. However, one point that needs to be 
realised as a matter of distinction between the institutions is that a 
change in the statute law which is brought about through an investigation 
and recommendation of the Ombudsman will sometimes also provide a ground 
upon which a result in favour of the complainant can be based. 142 On the 
other hand, unless the courts are able to find that any subordinate 
legislation before them is legally invalid, or if the legislature in 
amending legislation in response to judicial decisions or comment makes 
its effect retroactive, then a change in the law as a result of judicial 
activity will not provide a ground upon which a result in favour of the 






1972 Report, p.68, 
1969 Report, p.28, 
1969 Report, p.57, 
1972 Report, p.80, 
supra pp . 17-18. 
Case No. 6859. 
Case No. 2963. 
Case No. 3404. 
Case No. 6654. 
142 See e.g. 1965 Report, p.18, Case No. 1211; p.58, Case No. 623. 
However, it is not always the case that a change in the law as 
a result of a complaint will benefit the complainant's particular 
situation: See 1969 Report, p.93, Case No. 3838. 
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Practical Effects of Responses 
In this section I wish to briefly focus on what kind of things the clients 
of the agencies get when a response is made to their complaints which is 
favourable to them . This question has already been partly considered from 
d . ff t . t f . 143 It d . h h h t a i eren poin o view. was note in tat context tat t e cour s 
could quash the decision complained against, or prohibit a body from 
exceeding its powers, or compel a body to exercise its powers according 
to law, or enjoin activity, or declare the law. The courts in making 
such orders, are not so much concerned with the result as with seeing that 
the law has been and is followed. In some circumstances the Ombdusmen 
work in the same way - they recommend that the officials reconsider the 
case having regard to relevant matters, or that they act within the 
statutory powers conferred upon them. When this is done it means that the 
final practical result is in the hands of the official and consequently 
may be in favour of the complainant or it may not. Thus practical results, 
in the form of money payments, more import licences, drains maintained, 
contracts interpreted, and so on, can be seen to flow, but indirectly, 
from the supervisory role of the courts and the Ombudsmen. However, it 
is also clear that Ombudsmen can and do review the merits of particular 
cases, in contradistinction to the courts, and that they come to conclusions 
as to the merits of a case which if accepted by the officials involved, will 
result in practical consequences for the complainant. It can be seen that 
the Ombudsman is more directly involved with the actual results achieved. 
There are some occasions when the courts are able to be more directly 
involved in producing a result for the plaintiff. That can arise when the 
plaintiff if able to show a right to damages for any injury suffered at the 
hands of government bodies which falls within the recognised actions of the 
general law of torts or contract. Once again this is a complicated and 
(perhaps) developing area of the law. Clearly there are also differences 
between the situation of the Crown on the one hand and other public auth-
orities on the other. 144 In the context of this paper it is appropriate 
145 . to refer to authoritative works and to note that despite dicta appearing 
143 supra pp.13-16. 
144 See the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 and the works cited in n.45 post. 
145 E.g. H street "Governmental Liability"; J DB Mitchell, "The Contracts 
of Public Authorities"; P Hogg, "Liability of the Crown"; E J Houghey, 
"The Liability of Administrative Authorities". 
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in some cases146 the courts have so far resisted the temptation to 
av1ard damages for injuries sustained as a result of the negligent or 
unreasonable exercise of a statutory power. 147 In this respect the 
courts are unable to match the Ombudsmen's ability to gain for their 
complainants ex gratia compensatory type payments as a result of the 
equities of the case which has already been noted. 148 
Responses Touching Governmental Authorities 
It will have already have become apparent that the process of either 
the courts or the Ombudsmen responding to the people who come to them 
involved in some way an effect on the governmental authority against 
which an approach is made. Very often this process will involve a 
cost of some description for the particular authority. In fact, almost 
anything that the Ombudsmen do for their clients (apart from declining 
to investigate their complaint or g1v1ng some particular advice or 
making a referral in respect of it) will involve a cost of time to the 
agency being investigated. The same is also true, perhaps even more so, 
of the courts for by the time a matter comes before them considerable 
time has been spent in case preparation. 
Defending the Authority 
It is useful to note in passing that Ombudsmen are not always in a 
position of criticising or attacking departments. In the 1964 Report 
the Ombudsman noted that sometimes he could be a valuable shield to 
the departments. 149 It is of course clear that the courts are able to 
146 E.g. Dorset Yacht Company v Home Office [1970] A.C. 1004 per Lord 
Reid at pp 1030-1; Takaro Properties (in receivership and Another 
v Rowling [1976] 2NZLR 657 at p. 668 (as to the distinction between 
mistakes of a legal nature and mistakes of a factual nature). 
147 Takaro Properties Limited (in receivership) and Another v Rowling 
[1976] 2NZLR 657. 
148 supra at p. 42. 
149 1963 Report, p.7. Note also 1965 Report, p.14, Case No. 954 where 
the Ombudsman called on the complainant to substantiate his allegations 
or unreservedly withdraw them. 
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exonerate agencies of wrongly alleged reprehensible conduct, in the 
course of their dealings with a case. 
Controlling the Slackness of the Authority 
One formidable task that the Ombudsmen have taken on is that of trying 
to train the bodies within their jurisdiction, in the virtue of prompt-
ness. From time to time they have commented in their case notes of the 
delay to which they have been subject in receiving replies to their 
letters, from the agency. Sir Guy Powles has also dealt with delays on 
the part of departments which have affected his clients. 150on one 
occasion, on his own motion he chastised the Department of Internal 
Affairs for not having put into effect the Civil Defence Act 1962 which 
had sat around for somewhat over a year without any action having been 
taken on it by the department. 151 
Obtaining Charges in Administrative Practice 
This ability of the Ombudsmen is linked to the one just discussed. 
Examples of changes in practice are coming about as a result of the 
Ombudsmans suggestions or recommendations occur throughout the reports. 
The kind of changes achieved include things like the clarific~tion and 
updating of departmental publicity;152 the clarification and updating 
of forms; 153 the clarification or drafting of internal orders and guide-
lines;154 the improvement of consultations between departments (as well 
as with other affected bodies) 155 and improving intra-departmental 
procedures. 156 The cumulation of these changes introduced over the years 
amounts to a considerable reformative impact upon the administration. 
150 1967 Report, p.44, Case No. 2729; 1972 Report, p .81, Case No. 6161. 
151 1964 Report, p.35, Case No. 719. 
152 1964 Report, p.26, Case No. 331; p.68, Case No. 443. 
153 E.g. 1965, p.38, Case No. 1245; Case No Wll576 reported (1977) lNZAR 
146. 
154 E.G. 1977, Case No. Wl0786 reported (1977) lNZAR p.114. 
155 E.g. 1969 Report, p.53, Case No. 3761; p.73, Case No. 3415. 
156 E.g. 1971 Report, p.54, Case No. 5286; p.68, Case No. 6375; 1972 
Report, p.81, Case No. 6161. 
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There are other cases dealt with by the Ombudsman where he attempts 
to bring about, and sometimes succeeds, changes which can be more appro-
priately termed changes in policy. One case for instance involved a 
woman who had a state ward boarding with her. The Social Welfare 
Department was unable to find this girl a job and as she was not quite 
sixteen she was not eligible for an unemployment benefit. When she 
turned sixteen the board was paid out of the unemployement benefit. 
The complainant was told by the department that she would be paid board 
for the months prior to the girl's turning sixteen and that the amount 
would be established as a debt recoverable against the girl's future 
earnings. The complainant objected to such a course and the Ombudsman's 
investigation and representations to the department lead to a change of 
policy such that expenses incurred before the unemployment benefit became 
payable would be written off except to the extent that they exceeded the 
current unemployment benefit. 157 However, in this field the Ombudsmen are 
not always so successful at causing a change. As much can be seen from 
158 the Teachers College land case already referred to and from the saga 
of the attempts of the Ombudsman to get the Social Security Department 
to change its policy regarding the 'cutting down' of the New Zealand 
Superannuation where superannuitants also received pensions from Britain:59 
Obtaining Changes in the Law 
It is first useful to note that the Ombudsman is from time to time, able 
to bring about changes in the agency's interpretation of the law which it 
is administering. 160 This is, of course, pre-eminently the job of the 
courts but the Ombudsman is also able to achieve results for complainants 
by virtue of a different interpretation of the law being applied. 
The ability of the Ombudsmen to recommend changes in the law have already 
been discussed in different contexts. It is appropriate at this stage to 
157 1974 Report, p.53, Case No. 8489. 
158 1976 Report, p.17, Case No. 9757. 
159 1969 Report, p.13. 
160 E.g. 1964 Report, p.30, Case No. 754; 1972 Report, p.74, Case No. 
6188; 1974 Report, p.33, Case No. 8402. 
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note an example of a change that was achieved by the Ombudsman; 
perhaps it was one of Sir Guy's more satisfying victories. In the 1969 
Report
161 
he noted that he had received a number of complaints concerning 
attempts by the Social Security Department to recover, from beneficiaries, 
overpayments of benefits as debts. At that time he noted that he thought 
the provisions of s. 94B of the Judicature Act 1908 should be applicable 
to such overpayments. He considered the matter again in his 1970 Report162 
and by that stage he had managed to get the Secretary to Treasury to agree 
with him that s. 94B should apply in cases of overpayment by the crown. 
However, this wasn't the case as far as Social Security benefits were 
concerned because bys. 86(1) of the Social Security Act 1964 there was 
a mandatory duty on the Commission to establish as debt when an overpayment 
had occurred. However, the Ombudsman kept persisting and in his 1974 
Report he said 
11 
... the special nature and purposes of social security 
benefits (mean) they can be distinguished from other 
payments made by the crown, and special considerations 
should therefore be taken into account when deciding 
whether the overpayment of benefit should be recovered. 11163 
He then reports that his recommendations had largely been accepted and 
had been enacted in the form of s. 86(9A) of the Social Security Act 1964 
such that the equitable considerations of s. 94B applied to Social Security 
benefits. 
In noting these different ways that the institutions have an effect on 
the governmental authorities, I have not paid much attention to the 
influence of the courts. This is not because the courts don't have any 
effected in these areas for it is apparent that they do. Their pronounce-
ment on whether a particular administrative practice is in accordance with 
the law or not is obviously going to influence the future of that practice~64 
Similarly an order as to the validity of subordinate legislation is deter-
minative of the matter (which in theory, is not necessarily the case with 
the Ombudsmen - but in practice almost always is). It is rather because 
161 At pp.12-13. 
162 At pp.10-11. 
163 At p.9. 
164 See for example Anderson v Valuer General [1974) lNZLR 603 where, 
although the court refused the plaintiff the relief claimed, it 
came to a conclusion on the practice of the Valuation Department 
which has since governed the Department's practice. 
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a distinction can be discerned between differing functions of the two 
institutions in this area. Both institutions are required to resolve 
conflicts, but the courts do it in relation to the law and the Ombuds-
men, although they obviously have regard to the law, do it in relation 
to principles of administrative justice. The orientation of the two 
institutions is slightly different. The courts uphold and apply the 
law as such, while the Ombdudsmen search for and apply administrative 
justice. That much can be seen from the fact that the courts will only 
effect changes in practice and the law as a matter ancillary to uphold-
ing the law - the change comes about because the status quo was contrary 
to law; but the Ombudsmen can take a more direct approach to the law or 
practice in question and they can recommend changes not only on the 
basis that something is contrary to law, but also that it is unreasonable, 
unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory. The present law is not 
their limit - administrative justice in all facets is. To that extent 
the activity of the Ombudsmen in these areas is deserving of closer con-
sideration. 
Having examined in some detail the work of the two institutions in 
respect of the different (and similar) ways they respond to their 
"cl ients 11 , the grounds upon which they make those responses and briefly 
noted some of the practical outcomes of those responses, it is necessary 
to stress two points already made and then to note a few other significant 
factors about the two institutions before evaluating the significance of 
it all. 
First, it is essential to any comparison of the institutions to keep in 
mind the special abilities of the Ombudsmen in respect of finding out 
the basis of each case. The fact that they have access to all the 
government files on a matter, that with ease they can penetrate the 
wall of silence that can so easily shield the reality of the internal 
activity of the bureaucracy in a given situation is of great significance 
to their ability to come to a conclusion that an act, or a practice, or 
a law was based on a mistake of fact or was oppressive, or contrary to law. 
It is perhaps of even greater significance to their ability to decide 
whether a discretionary power has been exercised for an improper purpose. 
By contrast the courts are subject to strict rules as to admissibility of 
evidence and their ability to get to the core of a matter is otherwise 
hedged about by technicalities. 
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The other point to be stressed is that the Ombudsmen have no power to 
coerce acceptance of and compliance with the conclusions they come to 
in a particular case. In a great many cases this is of no significance 
but the fact remains that officials are in law not obliged to accept 
the Ombudsmen's view on the interpretation of a particular regulation, 
or the equities of a particular case or the correctness or otherwise of 
some policy. The fact refusals to follow Ombudsmen's recommendations 
do occur, and it would seem, occur more often in the very areas where 
the courts are unable to conduct review, must be treated as significant. 
The Ombudsman institution, has, in the course of its history in the 
English speaking world, employed a number of techniques and been able 
to fulfil certain functions which are not associated with the courts. 
The first is that of publicity of the office,
165 
linked, in some juris-
dictions, with a peripatetic service.166 In New Zealand, these techniques 
have not been employed as vigourously or as usefully as they appear have 
been in some other countries. The description by the Ontario Ombudsman 
of his and his staff's processions around the province holding public 
meetings and private hearings conjures up pictures of the Curia Regis 
travelling throughout the domain. Publicity is obviously important to 
the effectiveness of the institution as is indicated by the fact that 
on the occasions when Sir Guy Powles appeared on television the number 
of complaints in the ensuing days rocketed; and by the fact that the 
Justice Department's ratings on the "Number of Complaints per Department" 
chart increased dramatically after Sir Guy had conducted the investigation 
at Paremoremo Prison. On the other hand too much publicity could so 
burden the Ombudsmen with complaints that the effectiveness of the instit-
ution could be hindered, especially in the areas of expedition, thorough 
consideration of the complaint and personal humanising contact with the 
complainants. 
The second is the reporting sanction. The Ombudsmen have the psycholog-
ically powerful tools of reporting to Parliament and of having his con-
clusions on a particular subject made known in the press. A case in point 
is that concerning the compulsory acquisition of a company's land by 
notice in the Gazette in February 1975. The company objected to the order 
but the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board, having regard to the 
165 Note 1975 Report, p.14; Ontario 1975-76 Report, Alberta 1970 Report, 
p.12. 
166 Alberta 1974 Report, p.5; 1977 Report (NZ), p.11; Ontario 1975-76 
Report. 
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advanced state of the contruction of the bridge had no alternative but 
to hold that the taking of the land for road alignment was "sound and 
necessary". The Chief Ombudsman, despite his conclusion asto the justice 
of the situation and that the complaint was completely justified, found 
hi mself barred from acting because of a jurisdictional limitation. Never-
theless, he was able to make his views well known in the press and to 
Parliament. 167 Although it is unlikely that agencies and officials live 
trembling in the shadow of this publicity sanction it is also unlikely that 
it never influences a departmental response to recommendations of the 
Ombudsmen in the 'borderline' cases. The technique must be seen as an 
additional and occasionally useful weapon in the Ombudsmen's armory. 
The third technique to notice is the fact that under s. 13(2) the Ombudsmen 
can investigate on their own motion. This gives the institution a particular 
flexibility in dealing with issues of administrative justice and although 
hasn't been used much in practice in New Zealand it has possibilities of 
development for the future. 
A related matter is that the Ombudsman is often able to use a complaint as 
a springboard from which other questions and areas, not necessarily connected 
to the complaint but revealed by it, may be investigated. A good example is 
provided by the complaint concerning the entry of Officers of the Valuation 
Department on to private property. The complaint led the Ombudsmen to 
conduct a review of all the statutory provisions relating to the entry on 
to private property by public officers. 168 Such an ability is obviously 
beyond the scope of the courts work. 
That ability points to a function which the Ombudsmen seem to be taking on 
increasingly. That is to conduct broad views of the law and the policy in a 
particular field. In New Zealand the Ombudsman has examined the principles 
and law relating to compensation for damage suffered as a result of public 
works; 169 the law and policy relating to the bonding system; 170 questions 
relating to the Mental Health legislation; 171 and the statutory provisions 
relating to entry on to private property. 172 I am not suggesting that the 
Ombudsmen have made a startling impact on the areas that have been reviewed 
167 Reported Evening Post 8.8.77 . 
168 1976 Report, p.10. 
169 1969 Report, p.14; see also 1976 Report, p.17, Case No. 9757. 
170 1969 Report, p.13; 1975 Report, p.6. 
171 1969 Report, p.15. 
172 See also Ontario Report 1975-76, p.30 (Note also pp 19-20). 
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So far the effect of such reviews has been almost imperceptible. They 
nevertheless have a contribution to make in the area, especially in the 
light of the experience they gain through dealing with individual cases. 
The second function which the Ombudsmen seem to exercise generally, is 
what can be called the didactic function. Elements of it have been 
alluded to throughout the paper. It involves the Ombudsmen in teaching, 
by the carrot and the stick method, public authorities the principles and 
practice of administrative justice: the undesirability of delay, the 
proper exercise of discretion, the rule of law and so on. In a sense the 
courts also function in this area but not positively so as the Ombudsmen 
do, not in day to day contact with officials, not in direct and frequent 
sermons on what is and is not to be done. 
Evaluation and Conclusion 
The examination of the two institutions and their response/resolution 
processes have pointed up a number of factors. 
First, it is apparent that the Ombudsmen can respond to a complaint in 
a wider number of ways and with more flexibility than the courts. 
Secondly, the grounds upon which particular responses are based are to 
a large extent similar in the reasoning processes of both the Ombudsmen 
and the courts. In addition though, the Ombudsmen could base his con-
clusions on wider grounds; in particular that the activity in question 
was based on a law which was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or impro-
perly discriminatory and that having regard to the merits of the case, 
the decision was wrong. Thirdly, the practical results of responses 
which helped the individual covered a wider range in the case of the 
Ombudsmen than in that of the Courts: from helping by giving advice even 
where the matter was one beyond the limits of jurisdiction to helping by 
having the matter reconsidered according to the law to helping by achieving 
a result according to the equities of the case. Fourthly, the court is 
able to enforce its decisions (though not against the Crown which is of 
no consequence as the Crown abides by the Courts decision) while the 
Ombudsman is not (although again in practice it has not so far turned out 
to be of any great consequence). Fifthly, the Ombudsmen are able to, and 
do,take a more direct approach to achieving the practical redress which 
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the complainant seeks for the complaint to be satisfied than the courts 
can. Sixthly, the courts are able to review the decisions of Ministers. 
but to all practical effects the Ombudsmen can on most occasions also. 
Seventhly, in order to be effective the Ombudsmen need to maintain good 
relationships with the Administration, and therefore the results achieved 
will be somewhat tempered by that need 173 whereas the courts are not in a 
position where they have to avoid treading on to many people's toes too 
often in order to be effective. Eightly, the Ombudsmen are better equipped 
in dealing with the Administration to discover whole circumstances of a 
case. Ninethly, by virtue of factors like cost, expedition, informality 
and personal approach the Ombudsman would seem to be more attractive to 
the public at large. 
An assessment of those factors as a whole could lead one to believe that 
the Ombudsman institution was a God given solution to end all administrative 
ills, and by far the more useful efficient and generally attractive of the 
two institutions. It is true that the Ombudsman has been the cause of a 
considerable body of administrative reform over the years, that it has been 
accepted as a necessary and desirable part of the system and that it has 
the potential for development. However, it has not turned the system 
upside down; the increased flow of complaints after television appearances 
would seem to indicate that there is still a vast number of complaints not 
coming to the Ombudsman and that in many people's minds an Ombudsman is not 
thought of as the first person to whom one would go with a complaint; and 
although there is room for development in the functions of the institution, 
it cannot go too far. By contrast the courts, although they can be and are 
criticised in respect of many things have a stabilised constitutional 
position and a recognised status in the community. They too, have potential 
for development as present judicial activity indicates. As was stated at 
the beginning of the paper, these two institutions or either of them are 
unlikely to be determinative of constitutional changes on their own. 
Certainly, as Mr Castle one of the present Ombudsmen has said, it cannot be 
envisaged that the Ombudsmen would supplant the courts174 with respect to 
the supervision of governmental activity. However, both the Ombudsman instit-
ution ad the courts can be seen in the context of society and government 
and the trends that can be discerned to be flowing in both . The fact that 
there has been a long period of the growth and extension of the executive 
173 See Alberta 1976 Report, p.13, quoting from a paper by Mr Maloney, 
Ontario Ombudsman, delivered to the International Ombudsmen's Conference 
1976 called "The powers of the Ombudsman and their judicious use." 
174 Reported Evening Post 23,8.77. 
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and its power, until now it reaches into almost every area of modern 
mans life can be seen to have generated a response of which both the 
Ombudsman institution and the present judicial activism form a part. 
The institution of Parliament which has been on the decline since 
Executive power began to increase its attempting to reassert its control 
of old and it is using methods like Select Committees, the Public 
Expenditure Committee, the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the 
Ombudsmen to do this. It may be that Parliament will on the basis of 
the present or future record of the Ombudsman institution increase its 
power and jurisdiction in order that its own power will be increased. 
However, such a move would not appear to be in keeping with the nature 
of the recent change to the office as to reporting and so on when juris-
diction was extended to local bodies. 
Another possible development could be that the desirable attributes of 
both the Ombudsmen and the courts are combined in some body having special 
jurisdiction in administrative law matters. So far such a possibility has 
been eschewed in both Britain and New Zealand, despite the ardent advocation 
of an Anglicised Consiel d 1 Etat by Professor Mitchell , 175and an Administ-
rative court by Mr Orr. 176 Yet the fact remains that there are areas of 
governmental activity which are beyond effective supervision by the Courts 
and the Ombudsmen but which may be thought to desirable that they be subject 
to some measure of control. 
However, in the meantime it seems apparent that the institutions will 
continue to fulfil their functions side by side and will no doubt develop 
or not according to the exigencies of society to which they will be subject. 
Although the Ombudsman institution has many assets and appears capable of 
dramatic deeds in the pursuit of justice in administration it is appropriate 
to end with the words of Sir Guy Powles: 
11 For myself, I would urge, and have urged, a cautious 
approach. I would deplore any tendency to exaggerate 
the influence of the office, to think that the Ombudsman 
is the great righter of all wrongs, the Sir Galahad for 
the relief of citizens. But at the same time I recognise 
that there is a social value in a sympathetic ear into 
which the suffering citizen may pour pent-up grievances. 
175 See e,g . (1962) Public Law 24. 
176 K .J Scott Memorial Lecture 1965, "An Administrative Court: Its 
scope and Purpose." 
- 57 -
The office is not, however, a universal panacea 
against all adminstrative ills, but it is a fairly 
mundane, useful, and effective tool in the hands 
of the public, through the legislature to keep the 
administration trimmed down to size." 177 
177 "Aspects of the Search for Administrative Justice" opcit p.154. 
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